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Abstract
We further generalize the stochastic version of the replicator dynamics due to Fudenberg and Harris [7]. In particular,
we add a random jump term to the payoff function to simulate anomalous events and their effects on the fitness.
Assuming a 2×2 game and using a particular characteristic of the jump functions we are able to estimate the ergodic
measure for all games. Lastly, working with results and methods developed by Imhoff [11], we prove some stability
theorems for an arbitrary n× n game.
ii
I dedicate this work to my wife and daughter. With hard work and determination my “pooky bear”, you are able to
accomplish any goal.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Game theory is a way to put a mathematical structure on the strategic interplay of agents in a competitive environ-
ment. Evolutionary game theory is the study of how the game evolves over time. To structure the game we need to
identify possible tactics and give a quantitative identification to distinguish the differences between each one. The
possible tactics that the players use we will call strategies, which will be labeled S1 through Sn, for some fixed
n ∈ N. Furthermore, the payoff of a player using Si against a player using Sj will be denoted as aij . Moreover, for
the payoffs we will assume that only the strategy matters, not who is playing the strategy. This is called a symmetric
game. Furthermore, a player will only play against one other player at a time. We call S∗ = (Si1 , Si2) a Nash
equilibrium only if the best set of strategies to play against S∗ is itself. Hence, if the second player chooses any
other strategy than Si2 , they will not receive a better payoff.
Consider an environment where within a population there are n subpopulations such that a player in the
ith subpopulation is employing Si and each subpopulation contains players where no individual player has the
ability to affect any subpopulation. This assumption is a nice approximation to a large population in which an
individual’s choice of a strategy does not affect the proportions of the strategies being played. Moreover, the space
being worked in is connected and not discrete. The game will be played in the following way: an individual in each
subpopulation will be matched against another individual from a random subpopulation. The game will evolve by
having this process independently repeated over time.
Classic replicator dynamics focuses on the adjustment process in which the proportion of the population playing a
given strategy grows at a rate proportional to the current “fitness” of that subpopulation minus the average fitness of
all of the distinct subpopulations. Thus, growth is dependent on how the fitness of each subpopulation does against
“nature”. Given this deterministic model, we have that all Nash equilibria are fixed points of the dynamic, and all
strict Nash equilibria are asymptotically stable fixed points. Fudenberg and Harris [7] noted that due to random
fluctuations of the payoffs for the strategies, this deterministic model was not quite correct. To adjust for this the
authors proceeded to add a Brownian term to the “payoff functions”. The authors then take a 2×2 symmetric game
(two strategies), a linear payoff function, and give conditions as to which of the two subpopulations the process will
settle to, i.e., as to whether the proportion of the 1st subpopulation will converge to 0 or 1 as t→∞, and with what
1
probability. (There is no need to do any analysis on the 2nd subpopulation since it is the complement of the 1st.)
Determining the stochastic stability of the evolutionary process will give us an idea of how the population will evolve
over a long period of time.
Taking the ideas of Fudenberg and Harris [7], we conjecture that the Brownian term is not enough to fully capture
the effects of random fluctuations of the payoffs and so we will add a random jump term, along with the Brownian
term, to the payoff functions. This jump term will be driven by a Levy process which we assume is independent of
each of the Wiener processes. Our main goal is to give an analogous results to that of Fudenberg and Harris [7] and
compare our results to that of classical results.
1.2 Classical Game Theory
We will only consider a game with a 1st and 2nd subpopulation, however, most of the derivations will be done in
generality. The possible interactions and payoffs will be written as
S1 S2
S1 a11, a11 a12, a21
S2 a21, a12 a22, a22
,
where the first entry is the payoff to the “row player” and the second is the payoff to the “column player”. To make
the notation above more tangible we will go over some examples.
Example 1.2.1. Consider the game
S1 S2
S1 5, 5 3, 2
S2 2, 3 1, 1
.
This is called a strategy 1 dominate game, since the best payoff for both players is when they both play S1. Hence
(S1, S1) is a Nash equilibrium.
Example 1.2.2. A game of the type
S1 S2
S1 3, 3 0, 0
S2 0, 0 2, 2
is called a coordination game. The strategies (S1, S1) and (S2, S2) are both Nash equilibria. Even though the better
payoff is with (S1, S1), if the other player is playing S2, it would be in your best interest to play S2 as well. There is
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also another Nash equilibrium at (2/5S1 + 3/5S2, 2/5S1 + 3/5S2). The way to interpret the last strategy is a player
would play S1 2/5 the time and S2 3/5 of the time.
Example 1.2.3. A game of the type
S1 S2
S1 −10,−10 10, 1
S2 1, 10 −1,−1
,
is known as a mixed strategy game. The strategies (S1, S2) and (S2, S1) are Nash equilibria. Furthermore, the strategy
(1/2S1 + 1/2S2, 1/2S1 + 1/2S2), is also a Nash equilibrium.
Remark 1.2.1. To find the mixed Nash equilibria, take p as the probability that the row player uses S1 and q as the
probability that the column player uses S1. So the expected payoff for any player would be a11pq+ a22(1− p)(1− q) +
a12p(1− q) + a21(1− p)q := l(p, q). Solving ∂l(p, q)
∂p
= 0 would give us these values.
Example 1.2.4. Finally, we will look a game which is called prisoner’s dilemma,
S1 S2
S1 4, 4 −2, 7
S2 7,−2 0, 0
.
This is actually a strategy 2 dominate game. For if both players are using S1, then there is incentive for one player
to use S2. Now the payoff for the player that stayed with S1 is getting a negative payoff and thus has incentive to use
S2 as well. The strategy pair (S1, S1) is known as Pareto optimal, and as just seen, is not always a Nash equilibria.
The examples given above are that of a game played once. This begs the natural question: how would the
population evolve if the game is played repeatedly over time? Let ri(t) be the size of the i
th subpopulation at
time t, r(t) := (r1(t), . . . , rn(t))
T , R(t) :=
∑
i ri(t) and s(t) := (s1(t), . . . , sn(t))
T where si(t) := ri(t)/R(t) and
si(0) the initial condition. So si(t) is the proportion of the population playing Si at time t. Define u(·, ·) to
be the payoff function. By our construction u(si(t), sj(t)) = aij , but at times we will talk about the payoff
function in generality. Finally, define the fitness function ui of the i
th subpopulation as the expected payoff, i.e.,
ui(r(t)) =
∑
j
u
(
ri(t)
R(t)
,
rj(t)
R(t)
)
rj(t)
R(t)
= ∑
j
u(si(t), sj(t))sj(t) = ui(s(t))
. Taking A = (aij) to be an n×n matrix
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with the entries being the payoffs, we have that ui(r(t)) =
(
A
(
r1(t)
R(t)
, . . . ,
rn(t)
R(t)
)T)
i
. We will call A the payoff
matrix.
We will assume that the deterministic growth model for the ith subpopulation (for all i) is of the form
r˙i(t) = ri(t)ui(r(t)).
It should be noted that this growth is similar to the Lotka-Volterra model. Normalization reveals
s˙i(t) =
∑
j 6=i
si(t)sj(t)[ui(s(t))− uj(s(t))] = si(t)
ui(s(t))−∑
j
sj(t)uj(s(t))
 , (1.1)
which are replicator dynamics.
Remark 1.2.2. It is not obvious that the dynamics above equals replicator dynamics. However, we have that
s˙i =
∑
j 6=i
sisj [ui − uj ] = si
ui∑
j 6=i
sj −
∑
j 6=i
ujsj
 = si
ui∑
j
sj −
∑
j
ujsj
 ,
and since
˙(∑
i
si
)
=
∑
i
s˙i =
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
sisj [ui − uj ]
=
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
sjsiui −
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
sisjuj = 0,
coupled with the initial condition
∑
i
si(0) = 1 gives s˙i = si
ui −∑
j
ujsj
. We have further shown that the PDE
stays on the simplex.
Since our population is only the 1st and 2nd subpopulations, using the fact that s2(t) = 1− s1(t), we will simplify
the replicator equation. So
s˙1(t) = s1(t)(1− s1(t))[(a12 − a22) + (a11 − a21 + a22 − a12)s1(t)]. (1.2)
In this dynamic (and the general replicator equation), Nash equilibria are fixed points, but are not necessarily stable
[10]. We will now take the examples of games given above and show how the population evolves.
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Example 1.2.5. The dynamics of the strategy 1 dominate game has the form of s˙1(t) = s1(t)(1− s1(t))[2 + s1(t)].
Clearly 0 and 1 are fixed points with 0 unstable and 1 stable, since the right side is positive away from 0 and 1. Thus,
over a period of time, the entire population will be playing the S1 strategy.
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Example 1.2.6. The s˙1(t) = s1(t)(1 − s1(t))[−2 + 5s1(t)] represents the coordination game, where 0 and 1 are
clearly stable. In particular, if the initial condition is greater than 2/5, the flow is towards 1 since the right hand
side is positive, and if less than 2/5 the flow is to 0 since the right hand side is negative. Thus, the fixed point 2/5
is unstable.
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Example 1.2.7. For example (1.2.3), we see that s˙1(t) = s1(t)(1 − s1(t))[11 − 22s1(t)] has the fixed points 0 and
1 which are unstable, while 1/2 is stable. This can be seen by noticing that the right hand side is positive on the
interval (0, 1/2), and negative on the interval (1/2, 1).
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Example 1.2.8. Finally, we see that s˙1(t) = s1(t)(1−s1(t))[−2−s1(t)] has the fixed points 0 and 1, with 1 unstable
and 0 stable, considering that the right hand side is negative away from 0 and 1.
2 4 6 8 10
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
2 4 6 8 10
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
2 4 6 8 10
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
2 4 6 8 10
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
The dynamics of all of the examples, except for (1.2.7), reinforce how we would expect the population to evolve
over time. For example (1.2.7), we would expect the population to converge to one of the pure strategy Nash
equilibria, but since this is a one population model, the mixed strategy is the closet representation of this. The two
subpopulation replicator dynamic does give us those stable fixed points.
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1.3 Exploring the Fudenberg and Harris Model
We will derive the model of Fudenberg and Harris [7], following their procedure, and keeping the notation of §1.2.
Fudenberg and Harris [7] add a Brownian motion to the payoff function (this random term is considered to be a
“stochastic shock”) to change r˙(t) to the stochastic differential equation (SDE)
dri(t) = ri(t)
(
ui(r(t))dt+ σidWi(t)
)
∀i, (1.3)
where σi ∈ R+ and, Wi and Wj , for i 6= j, are independent. Applying Ito’s lemma to si(t) gives the SDE
dsi(t) =
∑
j 6=i
si(t)sj(t)
[(
ui(s(t))− uj(s(t))
)
dt+
(
σ2j sj(t)− σ2i si(t)
)
dt+
(
σidWi(t)− σjdWj(t)
)]
. (1.4)
Though we will skip the derivation, it can be seen how this equality comes about through the details of the construc-
tion of our new model.
We have that for all i, si is strictly in the simplex. We will bypass the proof since this is shown later for our
new model and the details are similar. Recalling that the authors take the two subpopulation model, we have that
s2(t) = 1− s1(t). Now define W (t) :=
(
σ1W1(t)− σ2W2(t)
)/
σ, where σ :=
√
σ21 + σ
2
2 . Note that W is a standard
Wiener process (this can be seen from characteristic functions and the independence of W1 and W2). Lastly, since
u1(s(t)) = a11s1(t) + a12s2(t) and u2(s(t)) = a22s2(t) + a21s1(t), equation (1.4) yields the SDE
ds1(t) = s1(t)
(
1− s1(t)
)[{(
a11 − a21
)
s1(t)−
(
a22 − a12
)(
1− s1(t)
)
+
(
1− s1(t)
)
σ22 − s1(t)σ21
}
dt+ σW˜ (t)
]
= s1(t)
(
1− s1(t)
)[
a12 − a22 + σ22 +
{
a11 − a21 − σ21 + a22 − a12 − σ22
}
s1(t)
]
dt
+ σs1(t)
(
1− s1(t)
)
dW (t).
(1.5)
This brings the analysis to a one dimensional process, in which there are a lot of results to utilize. In particular,
using results from Gihman and Skorohod ([8], page 119), Fudenberg and Harris [7] give conditions as to whether
s1(t) → 0 or s1(t) → 1 as t → ∞. We will now briefly explain the theorem that was applied. Note that the
statement of the original theorem is over the real line, however the proof for a finite interval is very similar. Let
dx(t) = α(x(t))dt + β(x(t))dW (t), where W is a standard Wiener process, α and β are locally Lipschitz, |α(x)| +
|β(x)| ≤ K(1 + |x|), for some K > 0, and β is a strictly positive function. Also, take x(0) to be the nonrandom
initial position and an arbitrary z ∈ (0, 1). Now define
I1 =
∫ x(0)
0
exp
[
−
∫ x
z
[2α(y)/β2(y)]dy
]
dx,
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and
I2 =
∫ 1
x(0)
exp
[
−
∫ x
z
[2α(y)/β2(y)]dy
]
dx.
The series of lemmas then tells us that: if I1 is infinite and I2 is finite then the process converges to 1 a.s.; if I1 is
finite and I2 is infinite then the process converges to 0 a.s.; if I1 and I2 are both finite then the process converges
to 1 with probability
I1
I1 + I2
and to 0 with probability
I2
I1 + I2
; and if I1 and I2 are both infinite then the process
oscillates forever with P
(
lim inf
t→∞ x(t) = 0
)
= P
(
lim sup
t→∞
x(t) = 1
)
= 1. We are now ready to state the author’s
conclusion.
Proposition 1.3.1. (Fudenberg and Harris [7])
1. If a11 − a21 >
(
σ21 − σ22
)
/2 and a22 − a12 <
(
σ22 − σ21
)
/2 then s1(t)→ 1 as t→∞ a.s.
2. If a11 − a21 <
(
σ21 − σ22
)
/2 and a22 − a12 >
(
σ22 − σ21
)
/2, we have s1(t)→ 0 as t→∞ a.s.
3. If a11 − a21 >
(
σ21 − σ22
)
/2 and a22 − a12 >
(
σ22 − σ21
)
/2 then s1(t) → 1 as t → ∞ with probability I1I1+I2 and
s1(t)→ 0 as t→∞ with probability I2I1+I2 .
4. If a11−a21 <
(
σ21 −σ22
)
/2 and a22−a12 <
(
σ22 −σ21
)
/2 then P
(
lim inf
t→∞ s1(t) = 0
)
= P
(
lim sup
t→∞
s1(t) = 1
)
= 1.
Furthermore, the distributions of the process s1(t) converge to a unique ergodic distribution as t→∞.
The first and second inequalities correspond to the strategy 1 dominate game and strategy 2 dominate game,
respectively, and inequality 3 is similar to the coordination game. Inequality 4 relates to the mixed strategy game,
however, a point mass does not exist in the this distribution. Since there is strictly positive variance in the unit
interval, this should be the case.
Now that we have the results of this model, we will reexamine the examples given in the previous sections to the
stochastic model. Even though we are able to choose the size of the σi’s in anyway we would, we will pick size so
as to keep the inequalities as they are in the examples. Included in these examples are simulations of the respective
SDE to reiterate what the theory says about the stochastic stability.
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Example 1.3.1. Taking σ1 = 2 and σ2 = 1 with the strategy 1 dominate example gives the SDE ds1(t) = s1(t)(1−
s1(t))[3− 4s1(t)]dt+
√
5s1(t)(1− s1(t))dW (t).
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As we can see from the simulations, even though there is some fluctuations towards 0, in the long run the process
flows towards 1, which corresponds exactly to the what was proved by Fudenberg and Harris in Proposition 1.3.1.
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Example 1.3.2. For σ1 = 2 and σ2 = 1 coupled with the coordination game example yields the ds1(t) = s1(t)(1 −
s1(t))[−1 + 2s1(t)]dt+
√
5s1(t)(1− s1(t))dW (t) with initial condition s(0) = .4.
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According to Propostion 1.3.1, the probability to converge to 0 is about .42, and the probability to converge to 1 is
about .58, which very close the simulations.
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Example 1.3.3. The mixed strategy game with σ1 =
√
15 and σ2 = 4, tells us we have the SDE ds1(t) = s1(t)(1−
s1(t))[17− 54s1(t)]dt+
√
31s1(t)(1− s1(t))dW (t).
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From the consistent spikes in the simulation we conclude that the process is recurrent and hence coincides to what
was shown.
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Example 1.3.4. Example (1.4) with the sigma values, σ1 = 1 and σ2 = 2, is the SDE ds1(t) = s1(t)(1 −
s1(t))[−4s1(t)]dt+
√
5s1(t)(1− s1(t))dW (t).
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The flow towards 0 validates what was shown by Fudenberg and Harris.
1.4 Replicator Dynamics with Deterministic Jumps
Following the method of Fudenberg and Harris [7], we will add a step function into the payoff function and show
how this term affects the replicator dynamics. Take ri(t) (i = 1, 2) to evolve in the following way,
r˙i(t) = ri(t)(ui(r(t)) + hi(t)),
where hi(t) is a step function. Using remark (1.2) and equation (1.2), our replicator equation looks like
s˙1(t) = s1(t)(1− s1(t))[(a12 − a22) + (a11 − a21 + a22 − a12)s1(t) + h1(t)− h2(t)]
= s1(t)(1− s1(t))×
× [{a12 − a22 + h1(t)− h2(t)}+ ({a11 − a21 + h1(t)− h2(t)}+ {a22 − a12 − h1(t) + h2(t)})s1(t)].
Thus, the jump terms affect the payoffs, and if large enough, change the fixed points and their stability. We will
take the examples of §1.2 and show how their dynamics change.
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Example 1.4.1. Take h1(t) = 5χ[2,∞)(t), h2(t) = 13χ[4,∞)(t) and the strategy 1 dominate game. So s˙1(t) =
s1(t)(1− s1(t))[2 + s1(t) + h1(t)− h2(t)].
0 2 4 6 8
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
The flow is towards 1 and when the first jump comes, this flow to 1 is intensified, however, after the second jump
comes, this flow is switched to 0.
Example 1.4.2. Take h1(t) = 2χ[3,∞)(t), h2(t) = 8χ[5,∞)(t) and the coordination game. So s˙1(t) = s1(t)(1 −
s1(t))[−2 + 5s1(t) + h1(t)− h2(t)].
0 2 4 6 8
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0.2
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0.6
0.8
1.0
The flow is towards 0 or 1, depending on whether the initial condition is below or above 2/5 respectively. When
the first jump makes an impact, the flow changes to 1, and after the second jump hits, the flow changes direction to
0.
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Example 1.4.3. Take h1(t) = 2χ[3,∞)(t), h2(t) = 13χ[5,∞)(t) and the mixed strategy game. So s˙1(t) = s1(t)(1 −
s1(t))[11− 22s1(t) + h1(t)− h2(t)].
0 2 4 6 8
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
One can see that 1/2 is the stable point, and after the first jump, the stability moves to 13/22. After the second
jump, there is a significant shift so that the flow is now to 0.
Example 1.4.4. Take h1(t) = 6χ[2,∞)(t), h2(t) = 5χ[4,∞)(t) and prisoner’s dilemma. So s˙1(t) = s1(t)(1−s1(t))[−2−
s1(t) + h1(t)− h2(t)].
0 2 4 6 8
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
The flow is towards 0 and after the first jump the flow is switched to 1. The second jump switches the flow back
to 0, however, not as intense as before the jumps.
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Chapter 2
The Model for Replicator Dynamics with
Jumps
2.1 An Introduction to Poisson Integrals
In order to add a random jump term into the stochastic replicator dynamics, we need to understand the machinery
behind this term. Take X to be an Rd-valued Le´vy process on (Ω,F , P ) and B ∈ B(Rd\{0}). Fixing ω ∈ Ω, define
∆Xω(s) := Xω(s)−Xω(s−)
and
Nω(t, B) := #
{
0 ≤ s ≤ t : ∆Xω(s) ∈ B
}
=
∑
0≤s≤t
1B
(
∆Xω(s)
)
.
So for each ω ∈ Ω and t ∈ (0,∞), the set function B → Nω(t, B) is a random counting measure. Moreover,
E
[
Nω(t, ·)
]
=
∫
Ω
Nω(t, ·)dP (dω) is a Borel measure.
Definition 2.1.1. ([2]) We call B ∈ B(Rd\{0}) bounded below if 0 /∈ B.
Lemma 2.1.1. ([2], page 87) If B is bounded below then Nω(t, B) <∞ a.s. for all t.
The randomness of this measure is a convient way to help us inject a noncontinuous “stochastic shock” into the
payoff function. However, in order to implement it’s application, we will need to exam this measure more closely.
The theorem below gives some important properties of this counting measure. Before we begin the statement of the
theorem we need to define the measure ν(·) := E[Nω(1, ·)].
Theorem 2.1.1. ([2], page 88) If B is bounded below, then
(
Nω(t, B)
)
t∈R+
is a Poisson process with intensity
ν(B). Moreover, for B1, . . . , Bn ∈ B
(
Rd\{0}), where Bi ∩ Bj = ∅ for i 6= j, (Nω(t, B1))
t∈R+
, . . . ,
(
Nω(t, Bn)
)
t∈R+
are independent processes.
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Note 2.1.1. Since N(t, ·) is generated by a Le´vy process, ν(·) is a Le´vy measure [18], i.e., ν is a Borel measure with∫
Rd\{0}
(
|x|2 ∧ 1
)
ν(dx) <∞.
Definition 2.1.2. We call Nω(t, ·) the Poisson measure, ν(·) the intensity measure and N˜ω(t, ·) := Nω(t, ·)−
tν(·) the compensated Poisson measure.
The next claim gives us an important characteristic of the compensated Poisson measure and the reason why this
measure is going to be the basis of our jump term instead of the just the Poisson measure.
Claim 2.1.1. For B bounded below, N˜ω(t, B) is a martingale measure and has zero expectation.
Proof. Fix t > s > 0 and B ∈ B(Rd\{0}) such that B ∩ {0} = ∅, which insures that N˜ω(t, B) = Nω(t, B)− tν(B) is
finite. The last part of the statement is clear. To show the martingale property we see that
E
[
N˜ω(t, B)|Fs
]
= E
[
Nω(t, B)− tν(B)|Fs
]
= E
[
Nω(t, B)− tν(B)−Nω(s,B) + sν(B) +Nω(s,B)− sν(B)|Fs
]
= E
[
(Nω(t, B)−Nω(s,B))− (tν(B)− sν(B)) +Nω(s,B)− sν(B)|Fs
]
= E
[
Nω(t, B)−Nω(s,B)
]
− (tν(B)− sν(B))+Nω(s,B)− sν(B)
= N˜ω
(
s,B
)
.
The fourth equality comes from independence and measurability.
We will spend the remainder of this section describing the integration with respect to each of the measures defined
above, and the space of functions which are integrable with respect to each measure.
The definition of the Poisson integral is very natural,
∫
B
f(x)Nω(t, dx) :=
∑
x∈B
f(x)Nω(t, {x}). (2.1)
Since for each x, Nω
(
t, {x}) 6= 0 ⇐⇒ ∆Xω(u) = x for some u ∈ (0, t], we are able to write the integral in the form
∫
B
f(x)Nω(t, dx) =
∑
0≤s≤t
f
(
∆Xω(s)
)
1B
(
∆Xω(s)
)
. (2.2)
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Remark 2.1.1. If we are given that Nω(t, ·) is a Poisson measure then Gω(t) :=
∫
B
xNω(t, dx) is a compound
Poisson process and the integral is of the form
∫
B
f(x)Nω(t, dx) =
∑
0≤s≤t
f
(
∆Gω(s)
)
1B
(
∆Gω(s)
)
. (2.3)
We will now consider this integral in terms of stopping times. For a set B ∈ B(Rd\{0}), define TB0 = 0 and
TBn = inf
{
s > TBn−1 : ∆Xω(s) ∈ B
}
. Hence
(
TBn
)
n∈N
are the arrival times when X has a jump the size of
an element in B. One can see that the arrival times are also stopping times. Using the arrival times, we have an
equivalent representation for the integral,
∫
B
f(x)Nω(t, dx) =
∑
n∈N
f
(
∆Xω
(
TBn
))
1[0,t]
(
TBn
)
. (2.4)
We will now move on to define a class of functions which will be integrable with this measure.
Definition 2.1.3. Fix B ∈ B(Rd\{0}) and T > 0. Take F : [0, T ]×B × Ω→ R that satisfies:
1. for each 0 ≤ t ≤ T , the mapping (x, ω)→ F (t, x, ω) is B(B)⊗Ft-measurable;
2. for each x ∈ B and ω ∈ Ω, the mapping t→ F (t, x, ω) is left continuous.
Let P be the smallest σ-algebra with respect to these mappings. We call P the predictable σ-algebra and a P-
measurable function is said to be predictable.
Taking K(t, x, ω) to be a predictable mapping, we further generalize the integral by defining
∫ T
0
∫
B
K
(
t, x, ω
)
Nω(dt, dx) =
∑
0≤s≤T
K
(
s,∆Xω(s), ω
)
1B
(
∆Xω(s)
)
. (2.5)
Define ρ
(
(0, t] × B
)
= tν(B) and consider all functions F : [0, T ] × B × Ω → R where F is predictable and∫ T
0
∫
B
E
[
|F (t, x)|2
]
ρ(dt, dx) <∞. Define H2(T,B) to be the space of these functions with the equivalence class set
by ρ× P .
Lemma 2.1.2. ([2], page 193) H2(T,B) is a Hilbert space.
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We will now work on making the integral with respect to ρ more tangible. We call a function F (·, ·) simple if
for m,n ∈ N such that 0 ≤ t1 ≤ . . . ≤ tm+1 = T , and B1, B2, . . . , Bn are disjoint Borel subsets of B with ν(Bi) <∞,
we have
F (·, ·) =
m∑
j=1
n∑
k=1
F˜tj1(tj ,tj+1](·)1Bk(·),
where F˜tj is a bounded Ftj -measurable random variable. Note that F (·, ·) is a left-continuous and B(B) ⊗ Ft-
measurable and thus predictable. Denote the space of simple functions as S(T,B).
Proposition 2.1.1. ([2], page 194) S(T,B) is a dense subset of H2(T,B) with respect to the L2
(
[0, T )×B×Ω, ρ×P
)
norm.
By the proposition above, for any F ∈ H2(T,B) there is a sequence {Fn} ⊂ S(T,B) such that
∫ T
0
∫
B
F (t, x)ρ(dt, dx) = lim
n→∞
∫ T
0
∫
B
Fn(t, x)ρ(dt, dx),
with respect to the L2 norm stated above. We are ready to inject a random jump term into the stochastic replicator
dynamics.
2.2 Construction of the Model
Recall that N(dt, dx) is a Poisson measure and N˜(dt, dx) is a compensated Poisson measure generated by a Le´vy
process X =
(
X(t), t ≥ 0) with respect to (Ω,F , (Ft, t ≥ 0), P ). To be meticulous, we will assume F0 contains all of
the null sets of F , Ft = Ft+ =
⋂
u>t Fu, and for every i, Wi is adapted to this filtration.
We adjust the Fudenberg-Harris model [7] by adding a jump term into the payoff function. Hence, we begin with
a jump-SDE of the form
dri(t) = ri(t−)
(
ui(r(t−))dt+ σidWi(t) +
∫
R
hi(x)N˜(dt, dx)
)
, (2.6)
where rihi ∈ H2(T,R), for T = ∞, and inf{hi(x)} > −1. (Note that we are taking the left limit in order to make
the coefficients left continuous.) For simplicity we will assume the set B is bounded and bounded below.
Definition 2.2.1. We call hi(x) the jump-affect of the i
th subpopulation.
17
Assumption 2.2.1. For all i:
a. inf
x∈R
{
hi(x)
}
> −1;
b. hi(x) is continuously differentiable;
c. hi(x) is bounded.
Remark 2.2.1. We are applying the compensated Poisson measure instead of the Poisson measure because this
measure disappears in the expectation, and what is left in the expectation is the classic replicator equation, with some
stochastic shocks.
Remark 2.2.2. Applying Itoˆ’s lemma, we can show that ri(t) is of the form ri(t) = exp
(
Yi(t)
)
where
dYi(t) =
(
ui(r(t−))− σ
2
i
2
)
dt+ σidWi(t) +
∫
R
log
[
1 + h(x)
]
N˜(dt, dx) +
∫
R
(
log
[
1 + h(x)
]− h(x))ν(dx)dt.
Recalling that ui(r(t)) =
(
A
(
r1(t)
R(t)
, . . . ,
rn(t)
R(t)
)T)
i
, our jump-SDE is further written as
dri(t) = ri(t−)
((
A
(
r1(t−)
R(t−) , . . . ,
rn(t−)
R(t−)
)T)
i
dt+ σidWi(t) +
∫
B
hi(x)N˜(dt, dx)
)
∀ i. (2.7)
The claim below is a nice consequence of the growth process.
Claim 2.2.1. Fix T > 0. Taking our assumptions above for ri(t), we have that
E[ri(T )] = E
[∫ T
0
ri(t)ui(r(t−))dt
]
Proof. Using an appropriate sequence of simple functions for both the Itoˆ and compensated Poisson integrals we see
that these terms will disappear in the expectation.
Remark 2.2.3. The intuition behind the jump term is that it captures changes in the payoffs that have come about by
sudden impacts in the environment. Consider the example of a species living on a volcanic island and it’s strategies
to get water. After a volcanic eruption, the payoffs for these strategies change due to the sudden pollution caused
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by the ash that came from eruptions, a blocked route from the rivers of magma, etc. For a particular and pertinent
example, the payoff of the strategies for pelicans in the Gulf of Mexico to get food has changed drastically due to the
impact of the oil leak. The market crash of 2008 is another great example of a sudden impact that caused changes in
the payoffs of the strategies for the traders.
The next step will be to normalize these processes and apply Itoˆ’s lemma. Denote [·, ·] as the quadratic variation,
ri(t)c as the continuous part and ri(t)d is the discontinuous part. So for s(t) =
(
r1(t)
r1(t) + . . .+ rn(t)
, . . . ,
rn(t)
r1(t) + . . .+ rn(t)
)
, Itoˆ’s lemma gives
dsi(t) =
∑
j 6=i
−ri(t−)
R(t−)2 drj(t)c +
(
1
R(t−) +
−ri(t−)
R(t−)2
)
dri(t)c
+
1
2
∑
j 6=i
2ri(t−)
R(t−)3 d[rj(t)c, rj(t)c] +
1
2
( −1
R(t−)2 +
−1
R(t−)2 +
2ri(t−)
R(t−)3
)
d[ri(t)c, ri(t)c]
+
∫
R
(
ri(t−) + ri(t−)hi(x)
(r1(t−) + r1(t−)h1(x)) + (r2(t−) + r2(t−)h2(x)) + . . .+ (rn(t−) + rn(t−)hn(x))
− ri(t−)
r1(t−) + r2(t−) + . . .+ rn(t−)
)
N˜(dt, dx)
+
∫
R
(
ri(t−) + ri(t−)hi(x)
(r1(t−) + r1(t−)h1(x)) + (r2(t−) + r2(t−)h2(x)) + . . .+ (rn(t−) + rn(t−)hn(x))
− ri(t−)
r1(t−) + r2(t−) + . . .+ rn(t−) −
∑
j 6=i
rj(t−)hj(x)−ri(t−)
R(t−)2
−ri(t−)hi(x)
(
1
R(t−) +
−ri(t−)
R(t−)2
))
ν(dx)dt.
Substituting ri(t) = si(t)R(t), we get
dsi(t) =
∑
j 6=i
si(t−)sj(t−)
[
(As(t−))i − (As(t−))j)dt+ (sj(t−)σ2j − si(t−)σ2i )dt
+ (σidWi(t)− σjdWj(t))
]
+
∫
R
(
si(t−) + si(t−)hi(x)
(s1(t−) + s1(t−)h1(x)) + (s2(t−) + s2(t−)h2(x)) + . . .+ (sn(t−) + sn(t−)hn(x))
− si(t−)
s1(t−) + s2(t−) + . . .+ sn(t−)
)
N˜(dt, dx)
+
∫
R
(
si(t−) + si(t−)hi(x)
(s1(t−) + s1(t−)h1(x)) + (s2(t−) + s2(t−)h2(x)) + . . .+ (sn(t−) + sn(t−)hn(x))
− si(t−)
s1(t−) + s2(t−) + . . .+ sn(t−) −
∑
j 6=i
[sj(t−)hi(x)si(t−)− sj(t−)hj(x)si(t−)]
 ν(dx)dt.
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After collecting the terms we arrive at
dsi(t) =
∑
j 6=i
si(t−)sj(t−)((As(t−))i − (As(t−))j) + (sj(t−)σ2j − si(t−)σ2i )
+
∫
R
(
si(t−) + si(t−)hi(x)
(s1(t−) + s1(t−)h1(x)) + . . .+ (sn(t−) + sn(t−)hn(x))
− si(t−)
s1(t−) + . . .+ sn(t−) −
∑
j 6=i
[sj(t−)hi(x)si(t−)− sj(t−)hj(x)si(t−)]
 ν(dx)
 dt
+
∑
j 6=i
si(t−)sj(t−)(σidWi(t)− σjdWj(t))
+
∫
R
(
si(t−) + si(t−)hi(x)
(s1(t−) + s1(t−)h1(x)) + . . .+ (sn(t−) + sn(t−)hn(x))
− si(t−)
s1(t−) + . . .+ sn(t−)
)
N˜(dt, dx).
(2.8)
Note 2.2.1. In the derivation above, we are missing the term
1
2
∑
j 6=i,k 6=i
j 6=k
2ri(t−)
R(t−)3 d
[
rj(t)c, rk(t)c
]
. However, since the
Wiener processes are pairwise independent, d
[
rj(t)c, rk(t)c
]
= 0.
We need to be careful above with the domain of the process and make sure that s(t) is strictly in the simplex,
which we define the n-dimensional simplex as ∆n. If this is not the case, we would need to add a reflection condition
on the boundary. However, since ri has exponential growth (Remark 2.2.3) this should be the case. The claim below
advances this fact.
Proposition 2.2.1. We have that P
(
s(t) ∈ ∆n for all t ≥ 0
)
= 1.
Proof. We will first show that for t ≥ 0, we have that
n∑
i=1
si(t) = 1 a.s. Define the map (s1(t), . . . , sn(t)) →
n∑
i=1
si(t) := G(t), and set G(0) = 1. Itoˆ’s lemma gives us that
d(G(t)) =
n∑
i=1
dsi(t)c +
∫
R
(
n∑
i=1
si(t−) +
n∑
i=1
si(t−) + si(t−)hi(x)
(s1(t−) + s1(t−)h1(x)) + . . .+ (sn(t−) + sn(t−)hn(x))
−
n∑
i=1
si(t−)
s1(t−) + . . .+ sn(t−) −
n∑
i=1
si(t−)
)
N˜(dt, dx)
=
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
si(t−)sj(t−)((As(t−))i − (As(t−))j) + (sj(t−)σ2j − si(t−)σ2i )
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+∫
R
(
si(t−) + si(t−)hi(x)
(s1(t−) + s1(t−)h1(x)) + . . .+ (sn(t−) + sn(t−)hn(x))
− si(t−)
s1(t−) + . . .+ sn(t−) −
∑
j 6=i
[sj(t−)hi(x)si(t−)− sj(t−)hj(x)si(t−)]
 ν(dx)
 dt
+
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
si(t−)sj(t−)(σidWi(t)− σjdWj(t))
=
 n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
si(t−)sj(t−)As(t−))i −
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
si(t−)sj(t−)(As(t−))j
 dt
+
 n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
si(t−)sj(t−)sj(t−)σ2j −
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
si(t−)sj(t−)si(t−)σ2i
 dt
+
∫
R
(
n∑
i=1
si(t−) + si(t−)hi(x)
(s1(t−) + s1(t−)h1(x)) + . . .+ (sn(t−) + sn(t−)hn(x))
−
n∑
i=1
si(t−)
s1(t−) + . . .+ sn(t−) −
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
sj(t−)hi(x)si(t−) +
n∑
1=i
∑
j 6=i
sj(t−)hj(x)si(t−)
 ν(dx)dt
+
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
si(t−)sj(t−)σidWi(t)−
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
si(t−)sj(t−)σjdWj(t)
= 0 a.s.
Recall that since the Brownian motions are pairwise independent, by the nature of the mapping, the second term of
the continuous part of the process is just zero. Furthermore, the first and second sums in the integral both add up
to 1 and hence they cancel. Therefore, by the initial condition we are done.
Finally, we show that the process does not hit or jump over the boundary in finite time. Define Ψ : ∆n → Rn−1
by Ψ(y) =
(
log(y1/yn), log(y2/yn), . . . , log(yn−1/yn)
)T
. Furthermore, take τ to be the first time the process leaves
the simplex (i.e., such that si(t) ≤ 0 for some i) and take Z(t) := Ψ(s(t)) for t < τ . Itoˆ’s lemma (and applying the
equality s1(t) + . . .+ sn(t) = 1) yields
dZi(t) =
∑
j
sj(t)c
∂Ψi
∂yj
(s(t)) +
1
2
∑
j,k
sj(t)csk(t)c
∂2Ψi
∂yj∂yk
(s(t))
−
∫
R
∑
j
Hi
(
s(t), h(x)
)∂Ψi
∂yj
(s(t))ν(dx)dt+
∫
R
(
Ψi
(
H
(
s(t),h(x)
)
+ s(t)
)
−Ψi(s(t))
)
N˜(dx, dt)
+
∫
R
(
Ψi
(
H
(
s(t),h(x)
)
+ s(t)
)
−Ψi(s(t))
)
ν(dx)dt,
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where H
(
y,h(x)
)
=
1
(y + yh(x)T ) · 1 (y + yh(x)
T )− 1
y · 1y. Thus
dZi(t) =
(As(t−))
i
−
∑
j
sj(t−)
(
As(t−))
j
+
∑
j
sj(t−)σ2j − si(t−)σ2i
+
∫
R
 1 + hi(x)
1 +
∑
j sj(t−)hj(x)
− 1 +
∑
j
sj(t−)hj(x)− hi(x)
 ν(dx)
 dt
+
(
σidWi(t)−
∑
j
sj(t−)σjdWj(t)
)
−
(As(t−))
n
−
∑
j
sj(t−)
(
As(t−))
j
+
∑
j
sj(t−)σ2j − sn(t−)σ2i
+
∫
R
 1 + hn(x)
1 +
∑
j sj(t−)hj(x)
− 1 +
∑
j
sj(t−)hj(x)− hn(x)
 ν(dx)
 dt
−
(
σndWn(t)−
∑
j
sj(t−)σjdWj(t)
)
− 1
2
(
σidWi(t)−
∑
j
sj(t−)σjdWj(t)
)2
+
1
2
(
σndWn(t)−
∑
j
sj(t−)σjdWj(t)
)2
−
∫
R
[(
1 + hi(x)
1 +
∑
j sj(t−)hj(x)
− 1
)
−
(
1 + hn(x)
1 +
∑
j sj(t−)hj(x)
− 1
)]
ν(dx)dt
+
∫
R
(
log
(
si(t−) + si(t−)+si(t−)hi(x)1+∑j sj(t−)hj(x) − si(t−)
sn(t−) + sn(t−)+sn(t−)hn(x)1+∑j sj(t−)hj(x) − sn(t−)
)
− log (si(t−)/sn(t−)))N˜(dx, dt)
+
∫
R
(
log
( si(t−)+si(t−)hi(x)
1+
∑
j sj(t−)hj(x)
sn(t−)+sn(t−)hn(x)
1+
∑
j sj(t−)hj(x)
)
− log (si(t−)/sn(t−)))ν(dx)dt.
Rearranging and simplifying, we arrive at
dZi(t) =
[(
As(t−)
)
i
−
(
As(t−)
)
n
+
1
2
(σ2n − σ2i ) +
∫
R
(
hn(x)− hi(x)
)
ν(dx)
]
dt
+ σidWi(t)− σndWn(t) +
∫
R
(
log
(
si(t−) + si(t−)hi(x)
sn(t−) + sn(t−)hn(x)
)
− Zi(t−)
)
N˜(dx, dt)
+
∫
R
(
log
(
si(t−) + si(t−)hi(x)
sn(t−) + sn(t−)hn(x)
)
− Zi(t−)
)
ν(dx)dt
=
[
(ei − en)TAΨ−1(Z(t−)) + 1
2
(σ2n − σ2i ) +
∫
R
(
hn(x)− hi(x) + log
(
1 + hi(x)
1 + hn(x)
))
ν(dx)
]
dt
+ σidWi(t)− σndWn(t) +
∫
R
log
(
1 + hi(x)
1 + hn(x)
)
N˜(dx, dt),
(2.9)
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where
sj(t) =
sj(t)
s1(t) + s2(t) + . . .+ sn(t)
=
sj(t)/sn(t)
s1(t)/sn(t) + s2(t)/sn(t) + . . .+ 1
=
eZj(t)
eZ1(t) + eZ2(t) + . . .+ 1
and
Ψ−1(y) =
1
ey1 + ey2 + . . .+ 1
(ey1 , ey2 , . . . , 1)T .
Define L as the infinitesimal generator for Z(t). Applying Theorem 2.1 in Meyn and Tweedie [17], we need to
show that there exists a ϕ ∈ C2 such that lim
|y|→∞
ϕ
(
y
)
= ∞ and there is a positive constant λ where Lϕ ≤ λϕ so
that P (τ =∞) = 1. Since our coefficients are time homogeneous, for t ≥ 0, our generator has the form
Lϕ(·) =
n−1∑
i=1
ai(·) ∂ϕ
∂yi
(·) + 1
2
n−1∑
j,k=1
bjk
∂ϕ
∂yi
(·)
+
∫
R
[
ϕ
(
· +
(
log
(
1 + h1(x)
1 + hn(x)
)
, . . . , log
(
1 + hn−1(x)
1 + hn(x)
)))
− ϕ(·)
]
ν(dx),
where
ai(y) =
(
ei − en
)T
AΨ−1(y) +
1
2
(
σ2n − σ2i
)
+
∫
R
(hn(x)− hi(x)) ν(dx)
and
bjk =
 σ
2
j + σ
2
n if j = k
σ2n if j 6= k
.
Note that ai(y) is bounded by a constant. Now taking ϕ(y) = 1 + |y|2, it is clear that Lϕ(y) is a linear term, and
thus there exists a λ where the inequality holds. Thus by Theorem 2.1 in Meyn and Tweedie [17], P
(
τ = ∞) = 1,
and we are done.
We will first consider a two subpopulation environment. Recalling that s2(t) = 1− s1(t), our focus just needs to
be on analyzing s1(t). Similarly to Fudenberg and Harris [7], we have the jump-SDE
ds1(t) = s1(t−)
(
1− s1(t−)
) [(
a11 − a21
)
s1(t−) +
(
a12 − a22
)(
1− s1(t−)
)
+ σ22
(
1− s1(t−)
)− σ21s1(t−))] dt
+ σs1(t−)
(
1− s1(t−)
)
dW (t)
+
∫
R
(
s1(t−) + s1(t−)h1(x)
(s1(t−) + s1(t−)h1(x)) +
(
s2(t−) + s2(t−)h2(x)
) − s1(t−)
s1(t−) + s2(t−)
)
N˜(dt, dx)
+
∫
R
(
s1(t−) + s1(t−)h1(x)
(s1(t−) + s1(t−)h1(x)) +
(
s2(t−) + s2(t−)h2(x)
) − s1(t−)
s1(t−) + s2(t−)
−s1(t−)h1(x)s2(t−)− s2(t−)h2(x)s1(t−)(
s1(t−) + s2(t−)
)2
)
ν(dx)dt,
(2.10)
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recalling that σ =
√
σ21 + σ
2
2 and W (t) =
(
σ1W1(t) − σ2W2(t)
)
/σ. Simplifying the integrals we have the alternate
expression
∫ T
0
∫
R
s1(t−)
(
1− s1(t−)
)[
h1(x)− h2(x)
]
s1(t−)
[
h1(x)− h2(x)
]
+ 1 + h2(x)
N˜(dt, dx)
+
∫ T
0
∫
R
(
s1(t−)
(
1− s1(t−)
)[
h1(x)− h2(x)
]
s1(t−)
[
h1(x)− h2(x)
]
+ 1 + h2(x)
+s1(t−)
(
1− s1(t−)
)[
h2(x)− h1(x)
])
ν(dx)dt.
(2.11)
Notice that the ν(dx)dt integral in equation (2.10) can be absorbed into the Lebesgue integral in our model. For
simplicity of the notation, we will use s(t) instead of s1(t). Therefore our SDE is of the form
ds(t) = α
(
s(t−))dt+ β(s(t−))dW (t) + ∫
R
K1
(
s(t−), x)N˜(dt, dx),
where
α(y) = y(1− y)
[
−a22 + a12 + σ22 +
∫
R
K2(y, x)ν(dx) + (a11 − a21 − σ21 + a22 − a12 − σ22)y
]
β(y) = σy
(
1− y),
K1(y, x) =
y
(
1− y)[h1(x)− h2(x)]
y
[
h1(x)− h2(x)
]
+ 1 + h2(x)
and
K2(y, x) =
y
(
1− y)[h1(x)− h2(x)]
y
[
h1(x)− h2(x)
]
+ 1 + h2(x)
+
[
h2(x)− h1(x)
]
y
(
1− y).
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Chapter 3
Analysis of the Model with the
Stochastic Lyapunov Method
3.1 An overview of the Stochastic Lyapunov Method
We will prove the applicable lemmas for a theorem given in Kushner in order to comprehend the method. Since this
concept might be a bit foreign, we will first discuss the ideas behind the proofs in order to get an understanding of
how we will proceed. Do note though that this is similar to the classical Lyapunov method. Take xt to be a strong
right-continuous Markov process, A the infinitesimal generator
(
A(f)(x) = lim
t↘0
Ex[f
(
x(t)
)
]− f(x)
t
)
with respect
to the supremum norm || · ||∞, V (x) a positive function and τ a stopping (Markov) time with Ex[τ ] <∞. If we have
that AV (x) := −k(x) ≤ 0, then by Dynkin’s formula,
V (x)− Ex[V (x(τ))] = Ex
[∫ τ
0
k
(
x(s)
)
ds
]
≥ 0.
A result in Dynkin ([5], Volume 2) tells us that if V (x) ≥ Ex[V
(
x(τ)
)
] and Ex[V
(
x(t ∧ τ))] → V (x) as t → 0 then
V
(
x(t∧ τ)) is a supermartingale. Taking τ →∞ a.s., we have that the processes V (x(t))→ c(ω) ≥ 0 as t→∞, for
some random variable c(ω). Moreover, as t → ∞, x(t) → {x : k(x) = 0}. We will now move on to the specifics of
this method.
The following is a list of assumptions that we will use in this section:
(3A) V (x) is nonnegative and continuous in the open set Qm := {x : V (x) < m}.
(3B) x(t) is a strong right-continuous Markov process and τm := inf{t : x(t) /∈ Qm}. Take τm(ω) = ∞ a.s., if
xω(t) ∈ Qm for all t <∞.
(3C) V is in the domain of Am, where Am is the infinitesimal generator over Qm.
(3D) For any x ∈ Qm and  > 0, Px
(
sup
s≤t
||x(s)− x|| > 
)
→ 0 as t→ 0.
Furthermore, for sets M and Q, and  > 0, we define NQ,(M) :=
{
x ∈ Q : ||x − y|| ≤  for some y ∈ M
}
. Lastly,
denote Bm by the set of ω such that x(t) ∈ Qm for all t <∞.
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Lemma 3.1.1. ([14], page 37) Assume 3A, 3B, 3C, and that AmV (x) ≤ 0, and take x0 ∈ Qm as the initial
condition. Then V
(
x(t ∧ τm)
)
is a nonnegative supermartingale of the process
(
x(t ∧ τm)
)
t∈R+
, and for λ ≤ m,
Px0
(
sup
0<t<∞
V
(
x(t ∧ τm)
) ≥ λ) ≤ V (x0)
λ
.
Furthermore, there is a random variable 0 ≤ c(ω) < m, where, as t→∞, V (x(t))→ c(ω) a.s. on Bm. Moreover,
Px0
(
Bm
) ≥ 1− V (x0)
m
.
Proof. Dynkin’s formula gives us
Ex0
[
V
(
x(t ∧ τm)
)]− V (x0) = Ex0 [∫ t∧τm
0
AV (x(s))ds] ≤ 0,
which implies that Ex0
[
V
(
x(t ∧ τm)
)] ≤ V (x0). Furthermore, since V (x) is in the domain of Am, V (x(t ∧ τm)) →
V (x0) as t→ 0 a.s., and thus V
(
x(t ∧ τm)
)
is a supermartingale by Dynkin ([8], Theorem 12.6).
The supermartingale inequality yields Px0
(
sup
0<t<∞
V
(
x(t ∧ τm)
) ≥ λ) ≤ V (x0)
λ
. For the convergence to c(ω), we
first note that
(
E
[
V
(
x(t∧ τm)
)])
t∈R+
is positive and decreasing. Hence
(
− V (x(t∧ τm)))
t∈R+
is a submartingale
with E
[∣∣− V (x(τm))∣∣] < m, and therefore Doob’s submartingale convergence theorem tells us we have convergence
in Bm. The last inequality is now clear.
Lemma 3.1.2. ([14], page 38) Assume the first part of 3B, V (x) nonnegative in the open region Q, V (x) is in the
domain of AQ, τ to be the first exit time out of the open region P ⊂ Q and finally AQV (x) ≤ −c for some positive
c in P . Then Ex0 [τ ] ≤ V (x0)/c.
Proof. Applying Dynkin’s formula and using the fact that V (xt∧τ ) is nonnegative, we have
V (x0) > V (x0)− Ex0
[
V
(
x(t ∧ τ))] =− Ex0 [∫ t∧τ
0
AQV
(
x(s)
)
ds
]
≥ cEx0
[∫ t∧τ
0
1P (x(s))ds
]
= cEx0 [t ∧ τ ].
Theorem 3.1.1. ([14], page 39) Assume 3A through 3D, AV (x) = −k(x) ≤ 0 and Qm is bounded. Take x0 to be
the initial condition and define Pm = Qm ∩ {x : k(x) = 0}. For some d0 > 0, we have for each 0 < d < d0, there
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exists an d such that k(x) ≥ d on Qm\NQm,d(Pm), i.e., we will assume that k(x) is uniformly continuous on Pm
and k(x) > 0 for some x ∈ Qm. Then with probability no less than 1− V (x0)/m, xt → Pm.
Define P =
⋃∞
m=1 Pm and Q =
⋃∞
m=1Qm and assume that the hypotheses above hold for all m. If for each
0 < d < d0, there is an d > 0 such that k(x) ≥ d on Q\NQ,d(P ) then x(t)→ P a.s.
Proof. Fix d1, d2 such that d0 > d1 > d2 > 0 and let i correspond to di. Without loss of generality, we will suppose
that NQm,2(Pm) ⊂ NQm,1(Pm). Define
Tx0(t, i) =
∫ τm
t∧τm
1Qm\NQm,i (Pm)
(
xx0(s)
)
ds,
with the convention Tx0(t, i) = 0, if t > τm. Hence Tx0(t, i) is the total time spent in Qm\NQm,i(Pm) after some
time t and before the first exit time from Qm, (or possibly t =∞). By Lemma 3.1,
Px0
(
x(t) leaves Qm at least once before t =∞
)
= 1− Px0(Bm) ≤
V (x0)
m
.
By Lemma 3.2, with probability one, Tx0(t, i) <∞ and therefore, as t→∞, Tx0(t, i)→ 0 a.s.
We now have two possiblities:
(a) there is a random variable τ(1) that is finite with probability one such that x(t) ∈ NQm,1(Pm) with probability
one, relative to Bm, for all t > τ(1);
(b) for ω ∈ Bm, x(t) moves from NQm,2(Pm) to Qm\NQm,1(Pm) and back to NQm,2(Pm) infinitely often in any
time interval [t,∞).
We will show that (b) has a zero probability. Fix δ1 > 0 and choose h > 0 so that
sup
x∈Qm\NQm,2 (Pm)
Px
(
sup
h≥s≥0
||x(s)− x|| ≥ 1 − 2
)
< δ1,
which we know exists by stochastic continuity and the compactness of Qm. Moreover, for each δ2 > 0 and initial
condition x0, there is a t <∞ so that
Px0
(
Tx0(t, 2) > h
)
< δ2.
However, both of these are contradictory to (b). Therefore, for x0 ∈ Qm,
Px0
(
x(s) ∈ Qm\NQm,1(Pm) for some s ∈ (t,∞)
)
→ 0 as t→∞.
Since the i’s are arbitrary, we are done.
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3.2 Stochastic Lyapunov Analysis of the Fudenberg and Harris Model
Recall that the diffusion is strictly in the unit interval. For this model, we will take A under the || · ||∞ norm. So for
f ∈ D(A) (the domain of A) and y ∈ (0, 1) equation (1.4) gives
A(f)(y) = lim
t↘0
E[f(s(t) + y)]− f(y)
t
= y(1− y)[(a12 + σ22 − a22) + {(a11 − a21 − σ21) + (a22 − a12 − σ22)}y]f ′(y)
+
1
2
σ2y2(1− y)2f ′′(y).
(3.1)
In order to make D(A) more tangible, we will show that C2b ([0, 1]) ⊂ D(A). Since we are working in an interval,
the issue of boundary conditions has to be addressed. In doing so we need to consider that the end points 0 and 1
are stationary points, i.e., they are absorbing. Moreover, they are the only stationary points. However, as the claim
below will show, the process will not hit the boundary in finite time. For simplicity we will set a = a11 − a21 − σ21 ,
b = a22 − a12 + a21 − σ22 for the remainder of the paper .
Claim 3.2.1. The process s(t) does not hit the boundary in finite time.
Proof. This will be shown by Feller’s criteria ([13], pages 342-348). For an arbitrary c ∈ (0, 1), define
p(x) =
∫ x
c
exp
{
−2
∫ η
c
ξ(1− ξ)(−b+ (a+ b)ξ)
ξ2(1− ξ)2σ2 dξ
}
dη
=
∫ x
c
exp
{
−2
∫ η
c
(−b+ (a+ b)ξ)
ξ(1− ξ)σ2 dξ
}
dη
=
∫ x
c
exp
{
− 2
σ2
∫ η
c
(−b+ (a+ b)ξ)
ξ(1− ξ) dξ
}
dη
=
∫ x
c
exp
{
− 2
σ2
∫ η
c
(−b
ξ
+
a
(1− ξ)
)
dξ
}
dη
=
∫ x
c
(
(η/c)2b/σ
2
([1− η]/[1− c])2a/σ2
)
dη
(3.2)
and
v(x) =
∫ x
c
p′(y)
∫ y
c
2dz
p′(z)z2(1− z)2σ2 dy
= k
∫ x
c
(y)2b/σ
2
(1− y)2a/σ2
∫ y
c
(z)−2b/σ
2−2(1− z)−2a/σ2−2dzdy.
Taking c = s(0), we need to determine that v(1+) = v(0−) =∞. First we will show that v(1+) =∞. Fix an  > 0
to be very small and define
m0 = min
{
(y)2b/σ
2
: y ∈ [c, 1]
}
,
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and
m1 = min
{
(y)−2b/σ
2−2 : y ∈ [c, 1]
}
.
Since these functions are strictly positive in this interval, m0,m1 > 0.
If 2a/σ2 < −1 then for an arbitrary d, where c < d < 1− , we have
v(1− ) ≥ k
∫ 1−
d
(y)2b/σ
2
(1− y)2a/σ2
∫ y
c
(z)−2b/σ
2−2(1− z)−2a/σ2−2dzdy
≥ k
∫ 1−
d
(y)2b/σ
2
(1− y)2a/σ2
∫ d
c
(z)−2b/σ
2−2(1− z)−2a/σ2−2dzdy
≥ m0kdk
( −1
2a/σ2 + 1
()2a/σ
2+1 +
1
2a/σ2 + 1
(1− d)2a/σ2+1
)
→∞ as → 0,
where kd :=
∫ d
c
(z)−2b/σ
2−2(1− z)−2a/σ2−2dz.
Now suppose that 2a/σ2 > −1. Then
v(1− ) ≥ m0m1k
∫ 1−
c
(1− y)2a/σ2
∫ y
c
(1− z)−2a/σ2−2dzdy
=
m0m1k
2a/σ2 + 1
∫ 1−
c
[(1− y)−1 − (1− y)2a/σ2(1− c)−2a/σ2−1]dy
=
m0m1k
2a/σ2 + 1
(
− log() + (1− c)
−2a/σ2−1
2a/σ2 + 1
()2a/σ
2+1 + log(1− c)− 1
2a/σ2 + 1
)
→∞ as → 0.
The case of v(0−) =∞ is shown with the same method. Done.
Define αˆ(x) = x(1−x)(−b+{a+b}x), βˆ(x) = x(1−x)σ and m∞ as the killing time (for our model P (m∞ =∞) = 1).
Note that p(x) is our scaling function and m(dx) :=
2dx
p′(x)βˆ(x)2
is our speed measure ([13], pages 342-348). Recalling
that 0 and 1 are absorbing, Itoˆ and McKean ([12], pages 105-108), give the conditions
A(f)(0) = − f(0)
E0[m∞]
= 0
and
A(f)(1) = − f(1)
E1[m∞]
= 0,
for f in the domain of A. Notice, for appropriate functions, we are guaranteed this by our infinitesimal generator.
Furthermore, Itoˆ and McKean ([12], pages 105-108) tell us we need
A(f)(x)m(dx) = f+(dx),
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where f+(dx) is the Borel measure generated by f+(m,n] = f+(n)− f+(m), and
f+(c) := lim
d↘c
f(d)− f(c)
p(d)− p(c) = limd↘c
f(d)−f(c)
d−c
p(d)−p(c)
d−c
=
f ′(c)
p′(c)
.
Hence f+(dx) =
(
f ′(c)
p′(c)
)′
dx. Also
A(f)(x)m(dx) =
(
2
p′(x)βˆ(x)2
αˆ(x)f ′(x) +
2
p′(x)βˆ(x)2
1
2
βˆ(x)2f ′′(x)
)
dx
=
((
2αˆ(x)
βˆ(x)2
1
p′(x)
)
· f ′(x) + f ′′(x) · 1
p′(x)
)
dx
=
(
f ′(c)
p′(c)
)′
dx,
and therefore we have our equality.
Clearly we need f to be twice continuously differentiable. Moreover if f is bounded on the interval this would
forgo any possible complications. Therefore C2b ([0, 1]) ⊂ D(A).
We will now move on to determining the conditions needed for the stochastic Lyapunov functions. Quite clearly
the sign of y(1− y)[−b+ {a+ b}y] is dependent on −b+ {a+ b}y := ζ(y), thus we will dissect this function. We will
determine what values of y will make the sign of ζ(y) negative/positive, and in what intervals. Our focus will be on
−b < {−a − b}y and what values of y makes this the inequality true. Before we proceed, we will make a couple of
observations: −b < 0 =⇒ σ22 < a22 − a12; and −b > 0 =⇒ σ22 > a22 − a12.
The analysis is broken down into two cases:
(I) We first assume −a− b > 0, i.e.,
−b
−a− b < y =⇒
b
a+ b
< 1 =⇒ 0 > a =⇒ a11 − a21 < σ21 .
i. Hence if −b < 0 then we would have that ζ(y) is always negative, which we have when σ22 < a22− a12 and
a11 − a21 < σ21 .
ii. If −b > 0 then ζ(y) is postive for y ∈ (0, b/(a + b)) and negative for y ∈ (b/(a + b), 1) and we have have
this when σ22 > a22 − a12 and a11 − a21 < σ21 .
(II) Next we have −a− b < 0, i.e., b
a+ b
> y.
i. If −b > 0 then we would have that ζ(y) is never negative, and this is the case when we have the inequalities
σ22 > a22 − a12 and a11 − a21 > σ21 .
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ii. Lastly, if −b < 0 then we have two different scenarios, b
a+ b
< 1 and
b
a+ b
> 1. If
b
a+ b
< 1 then
b
a+ b
< 1 =⇒ 0 < a =⇒ a11 − a21 > σ21 .
We have ζ(y) is negative for y ∈ (0, b/(a + b)) and positive for y ∈ (b/(a + b), 1) and this applies when
σ22 < a22 − a12 and a11 − a21 > σ21 . Finally if
b
a+ b
> 1 then we would have ζ(y) is always negative.
Moreover, simplifying the inequality
b
a+ b
> 1, it is easy to see that we get a11 − a21 < σ21 . Since
σ22 < a22 − a12, this brings us to the case I(i), and so we may disregard this inequality.
Recalling the theorem of Kushner [14], we will determine a stochastic Lyapunov function for each of the inequalities
stated above. Clearly, by the boundary absorption property, the initial condition is strictly in the unit interval.
For I(i), we need an f where f ≥ 0, f ′ ≤ 0 and f ′′ ≤ 0. We see that f(y) = 1− y holds these characteristics. The
theorem in Kushner tells us that the process converges to the set {0, 1}.
For II(i), we need an f where f ≥ 0, f ′ ≥ 0 and f ′′ ≤ 0. We see that f(y) = y will work, and like the previous
game, we have convergence to the set {0, 1}.
For the I(ii) case, a nonnegative f in which f ′(y) ≥ 0 for y ∈ (0, b/(a + b)) and f ′(y) ≤ 0 for y ∈ (b/(a + b), 1),
and clearly f ′′ ≤ 0 is needed. Defining f(y) := 16− (y − b/(a+ b))2 we get these characteristics and so the process
converges to the set {0, 1}.
As for II(ii), I have yet to find a function that is in D(A) to apply to this case. Considering the results of
Fudenberg and Harris,
(
if a11 − a21 < (σ21 − σ22)/2 and a22 − a12 < (σ22 − σ21)/2 then P
(
lim inf
t→∞ s1(t) = 0
)
=
P
(
lim sup
t→∞
s1(t) = 1
)
= 1
)
, we shouldn’t be able to find such a function.
Since the outcomes of the stochastic Lyapunov method do not give us probabilities for 0 and 1, in order to be
more precise we need to determine the invariant (ergodic) measure of the process. We will begin by defining the new
process sˆ(t) = p(s(t)) (for p(x) defined at the beginning of the section), c1 := p(0) and c2 := p(1). So sˆ(t) = c1 when
s(t) = 0 and sˆ(t) = c2 when s(t) = 1. Furthermore, define f(x) = p
−1(x), and bˆ(x) = σp(f(x))f(x)(1− f(x)). Then
following theorem gives us conditions to compute the invariant measure.
Theorem 3.2.1. ([19], page 54) If −∞ < c1 < c2 ≤ ∞ then a solution to sˆ1(t) exists for all t iff
∫ c
c1
βˆ−2(y)dy =∞
and c2 +
∫ c2
c
βˆ−2(y)dy =∞ for some c ∈ (c1, c2).
Under the latter conditions, if c2 =∞ then Px
(
lim
t→∞ sˆ1(t) = c1
)
= 1. Moreover, if c2 <∞ then Px
(
lim
t→∞ sˆ1(t) = c1
)
=
c2
c2 − c1 and Px
(
lim
t→∞ sˆ1(t) = c2
)
=
c1
c2 − c1 .
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The stochastic Lyapunov method gives us the latter conditions and thus we are able to recreate partial results of
Fudenberg and Harris. What we have shown is if we have
• a11 − a21 > (σ21 − σ22)/2 and a22 − a12 < (σ22 − σ21)/2, or
• a11 − a21 < (σ21 − σ22)/2 and a22 − a12 > (σ22 − σ21)/2, or
• a11 − a21 > (σ21 − σ22)/2 and a22 − a12 > (σ22 − σ21)/2
then we need
• σ22 < a22 − a12 and σ21 > a11 − a21, or
• σ22 > a22 − a12 and σ21 < a11 − a21, or
• σ22 < a22 − a12 and σ21 < a11 − a21
to hold as well in order to describe the invariant measures.
Remark 3.2.1. Even though we are able to compute the invariant measure for all of the possible cases [19], we
wanted to see how far the stochastic Lyapunov method could take the analysis of the model.
3.3 Applications to the Model
The analysis of our model will be done in the same manner as in the previous section. Define AJ under the supremum
norm, to be our generator. Hence AJ takes the form
AJ(f)(y) = lim
t↘0
E[f(s(t) + y)]− f(y)
t
=
{
y(1− y) [(a11 − a21)y + (a12 − a22)(1− y) + σ22(1− y)− σ21y]
+
∫
R
(
y[1− y][h1(x)− h2(x)]
y[h1(x)− h2(x)] + 1 + h2(x) + y(1− y)(h2(x)− h1(x))
)
ν(dx)
}
f ′(y)
+
1
2
σ2y2(1− y)2f ′′(y)
+
∫
R
{
f
(
y +
y[1− y][h1(x)− h2(x)]
y[h1(x)− h2(x)] + 1 + h2(x)
)
− f(y)
− y[1− y][h1(x)− h2(x)]
y[h1(x)− h2(x)] + 1 + h2(x)f
′(y)
}
ν(dx)
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={
y(1− y) [(a11 − a21)y + (a12 − a22)(1− y) + σ22(1− y)− σ21y]
+
∫
R
y(1− y)(h2(x)− h1(x))ν(dx)
}
f ′(y)
+
1
2
σ2y2(1− y)2f ′′(y)
+
∫
R
{
f
(
y +
y[1− y][h1(x)− h2(x)]
y[h1(x)− h2(x)] + 1 + h2(x)
)
− f(y)
}
ν(dx)
= y(1− y)
[(
a12 − a22 + σ22 +
∫
B
(h2(x)− h1(x))ν(dx)
)
+ {(a11 + a22)− (a12 + a21 + σ21 + σ22)}yBigg]f ′(y)
+
1
2
σ2y2(1− y)2f ′′(y)
+
∫
R
{
f
(
y[1 + h1(x)]
y[h1(x)− h2(x)] + 1 + h2(x)
)
− f(y)
}
ν(dx)
:=− k(y).
(3.3)
We will show that C2b ([0, 1]) ⊂ D(AJ), but before we are able to do this we need to ascertain some characteristics
of
y[1 + h1(x)]
y[h1(x)− h2(x)] + 1 + h2(x) .
Claim 3.3.1. For every y ∈ (0, 1) and x ∈ R, y[h1(x)− h2(x)] + 1 + h2(x) > 0.
Proof. We will use proof by contradiction. Suppose that there exists an x and y such that y[h1(x)−h2(x)]+1+h2(x) ≤
0. So we will work with the inequality y[h1(x)− h2(x)] ≤ −(1 + h2(x)). First let us suppose that h1(x)− h2(x) > 0.
Thus
y ≤ −(1 + h2(x))
h1(x)− h2(x) =⇒ 0 ≤
−(1 + h2(x))
h1(x)− h2(x) =⇒ 0 ≤ −(1 + h2(x)) =⇒ h2(x) ≤ −1,
which is a contradiction from our assumption on h2(x).
Now let us suppose that h1(x) − h2(x) < 0. Hence y ≥ −(1 + h2(x))
h1(x)− h2(x) , which implies 1 ≥
−(1 + h2(x))
h1(x)− h2(x) . The
rest is similar to that above.
Remark 3.3.1. Since Υ(y) :=
y[1 + h1(x)]
y[h1(x)− h2(x)] + 1 + h2(x) is continuous by the claim above with Υ(y) = 0 and
Υ(y) = 1 if and only if y = 0 and y = 1, respectively, it is clear that 0 ≤ Υ(y) ≤ 1 for y ∈ [0, 1].
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Proposition 3.3.1. C2b ([0, 1]) ⊂ D(AJ).
Proof. Since our space is compact we will apply Theorem 3.5 in [22]. So it must be shown that:
(a) D(AJ) is dense in C([0, 1]);
(b) there exists an open, dense subset of [0, 1], say Q0, such that if u ∈ D(AJ) takes a positive maximum at a point
q0 ∈ Q0, then AJu(q0) ≤ 0.
By the structure of AJ , we have that AJf(0) = AJf(1) = 0 for every f ∈ C∞([0, 1]). Thus, it is clear that
C∞([0, 1]) ⊂ D(AJ). Moreover, it is well known that C∞([0, 1]) is dense in C([0, 1]). Therefore, (a) is shown.
To show (b), take Q0 ⊂ (0, 1), open and dense, and a u ∈ D(AJ) such that for q0 ∈ Q0, u(q0) is a positive
maximum of u. Since q0 is a positive maximum, u
′(q0) = 0 and u′′(q0) ≤ 0. Moreover, by the remark above, we have
that u
(
q0 +
q0[1− q0][h1(x)− h2(x)]
q0[h1(x)− h2(x)] + 1 + h2(x)
)
− u(q0) ≤ 0. Thus AJu(q0) ≤ 0 and we are done.
Just as in the previous section, we will determine conditions for the sign of ζJ(y) := −bJ + {a + b}y, where
bJ := a22 − a12 − σ22 +
∫
B
(
h1(x) − h2(x)
)
ν(dx), and a and b are defined as in the previous section. We also need
the sign of ∫
R
{
f
(
y[1 + h1(x)]
y[h1(x)− h2(x)] + 1 + h2(x)
)
− f(y)
}
ν(dx)
in order to apply a stochastic Lyapunov function without much complication.
The following is a list of inequalities associated with the sign of ζJ(y):
(A) ζJ(y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ (0, 1) implies a22 − a12 < σ22 +
∫
R
(
h2(x)− h1(x)
)
ν(dx) and a11 − a21 > σ21 +
∫
R
(
h1(x)−
h2(x)
)
ν(dx);
(B) ζJ(y) ≤ 0 for all y ∈ (0, 1) implies that a22−a12 > σ22 +
∫
R
(
h2(x)−h1(x)
)
ν(dx) and a11−a21 < σ21 +
∫
R
(
h1(x)−
h2(x)
)
ν(dx);
(C) the sign change of ζJ(y) from negative to positive when y ∈ (0, bJ/(a+ b)) and y ∈ (bJ/(a+ b), 1) respectively,
gives the inequalities a22− a12 > σ22 +
∫
R
(
h2(x)− h1(x)
)
ν(dx) with a11− a21 > σ21 +
∫
R
(
h1(x)− h2(x)
)
ν(dx);
(D) and lastly, ζJ(y) is positive for y ∈ (0, bJ/(a+b)) and negative otherwise tells us that a22−a12 < σ22 +
∫
B
(
h2(x)−
h1(x)
)
ν(dx) along with a11 − a21 < σ21 +
∫
R
(
h1(x)− h2(x)
)
ν(dx).
Before we begin let us fix an arbitrary y ∈ (0, 1) and make some observations about when the inequalities below
hold.
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Observation 3.3.1. We have that
y[1 + h1(x)]
y[h1(x)− h2(x)] + 1 + h2(x) > y ⇐⇒ y + yh1(x) > y
2h1(x)− y2h2(x) + y + yh2(x)
⇐⇒ 0 > y2h1(x)− y2h2(x)− yh1(x) + yh2(x)
⇐⇒ 0 > (y2 − y)(h1(x)− h2(x)),
and since y2 − y < 0 for every y ∈ (0, 1), we have that h1(x)− h2(x) > 0, hence h1(x) > h2(x).
Observation 3.3.2. Reversing the inequality above, we see that
y[1 + h1(x)]
y[h1(x)− h2(x)] + 1 + h2(x) < y ⇐⇒ y + yh1(x) < y
2h1(x)− y2h2(x) + y + yh2(x)
⇐⇒ 0 < y2h1(x)− y2h2(x)− yh1(x) + yh2(x)
⇐⇒ 0 < (y2 − y)(h1(x)− h2(x)),
and since y2 − y < 0 for any y ∈ (0, 1), we have that h1(x)− h2(x) < 0, i.e., h2(x) > h1(x).
Observation 3.3.3. Finally,
y[1 + h1(x)]
y[h1(x)− h2(x)] + 1 + h2(x) = y ⇐⇒ y + yh1(x) = y
2h1(x)− y2h2(x) + y + yh2(x)
⇐⇒ (1− y)h1(x) = (1− y)h2(x)
⇐⇒ h1(x) = h2(x).
Definition 3.3.1. We will say that the ith subpopulation has jump dominance if hi(x) > hj(x) for all j 6= i and for
all x ∈ R.
We will now analyze the jump dominance. There are many cases in which just assuming jump dominance is not
enough for a smooth application and so we will add more assumptions of the process. Recall that ζ(y) = −b+{a+b}y
and that the initial condition is strictly in the unit interval. Details shown in the previous section are assumed to be
known.
1. We will first consider 1st subpopulation jump dominance. So for each jump, 1st subpopulation growth fairs better
than 2nd subpopulation growth.
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(a) We will assume inequality (A) and apply the Lyapunov function f(y) = 1− y. Thus we have that
f
(
y[1 + h1(x)]
y[h1(x)− h2(x)] + 1 + h2(x)
)
− f(y) = y −
(
y[1 + h1(x)]
y[h1(x)− h2(x)] + 1 + h2(x)
)
is negative by observation (3.3.1). Therefore s(t)→ {0, 1} a.s.
(b) We will now determine how this dominance affects the inequality (B). Applying f(y) = y, and assuming
ζ(y) ≤ 0 for all y ∈ (0, 1) and h2(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ R, we have
−k(y) =y(1− y)ζJ(y) +
∫
R
[
y[1 + h1(x)]
y[h1(x)− h2(x)] + 1 + h2(x) − y
]
ν(dx)
=y(1− y)ζ(y) +
∫
R
[
y(1− y)(h2(x)− h1(x)) + y[1 + h1(x)]
y[h1(x)− h2(x)] + 1 + h2(x) − y
]
ν(dx)
=y(1− y)
(
ζ(y) +
∫
R
[
(h2(x)− h1(x)) + yh1(x)− y
2h1(x) + y
2h2(x)− yh2(x)
y[h1(x)− h2(x)] + 1 + h2(x)
]
ν(dx)
)
=y(1− y)
(
ζ(y) +
∫
R
(h2(x)− h1(x))
[
1 +
−1
y[h1(x)− h2(x)] + 1 + h2(x)
]
ν(dx)
)
=− y(1− y)
(
−ζ(y) +
∫
R
(h1(x)− h2(x))
[
yh1(x) + (1− y)h2(x)
y[h1(x)− h2(x)] + 1 + h2(x)
]
ν(dx)
)
.
(3.4)
which is negative. Therefore s(t)→ {0, 1} a.s.
(c) Continuing with inequality (B), we will apply f(y) = 1 − y and assume that ζ(y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ (0, 1) and
h1(x) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ R. Hence
−k(y) =y(1− y)ζJ(y)(−1) +
∫
R
[
y − y[1 + h1(x)]
y[h1(x)− h2(x)] + 1 + h2(x)
]
ν(dx)
=y(1− y)
(
−ζ(y) +
∫
R
[
(h1(x)− h2(x)) + h2(x)− h1(x)
y[h1(x)− h2(x)] + 1 + h2(x)
]
ν(dx)
)
=y(1− y)
(
−ζ(y) +
∫
R
(h1(x)− h2(x))
[
1 +
−1
y[h1(x)− h2(x)] + 1 + h2(x)
]
ν(dx)
)
=− y(1− y)
(
ζ(y) +
∫
R
(h2(x)− h1(x))
[
yh1(x) + (1− y)h2(x)
y[h1(x)− h2(x)] + 1 + h2(x)
]
ν(dx)
)
,
(3.5)
which is negative by our assumptions and so s(t)→ {0, 1} a.s.
2. Next we will assume the 2nd subpopulation is jump dominant.
(a) Taking f(y) = y, since f
(
y[1 + h1(x)]
y[h1(x)− h2(x)] + 1 + h2(x)
)
− f(y) =
(
y[1 + h1(x)]
y[h1(x)− h2(x)] + 1 + h2(x)
)
− y is
negative by observation (3.3.2) and hence s(t)→ {0, 1} a.s.
(b) Considering inequality (A), we will make the assumption h1(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ R. Taking f(y) = 1 − y, we
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determine that
−k(y) =− y(1− y)ζJ(y) +
∫
R
[
y − y[1 + h1(x)]
y[h1(x)− h2(x)] + 1 + h2(x)
]
ν(dx)
=− y(1− y)
(
ζ(y) +
∫
R
(h2(x)− h1(x))
[
1 +
−1
y[h1(x)− h2(x)] + 1 + h2(x)
]
ν(dx)
)
=− y(1− y)
(
ζ(y) +
∫
R
(h2(x)− h1(x))
[
yh1(x) + (1− y)h2(x)
y[h1(x)− h2(x)] + 1 + h2(x)
]
ν(dx)
)
,
(3.6)
which is negative by our assumption. Thus s(t)→ {0, 1} a.s.
(c) Furthermore, for inequality (A), we will assume that ζ(y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ (0, 1) and h1(x) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ B.
Taking f(y) = 1− y yeilds
−k(y) =y(1− y)ζJ(y)(−1) +
∫
R
[
y − y[1 + h1(x)]
y[h1(x)− h2(x)] + 1 + h2(x)
]
ν(dx)
=y(1− y)
(
−ζ(y) +
∫
R
[
(h1(x)− h2(x)) + h2(x)− h1(x)
y[h1(x)− h2(x)] + 1 + h2(x)
]
ν(dx)
)
=y(1− y)
(
−ζ(y) +
∫
R
(h1(x)− h2(x))
[
1 +
−1
y[h1(x)− h2(x)] + 1 + h2(x)
]
ν(dx)
)
=− y(1− y)
(
ζ(y) +
∫
R
(h2(x)− h1(x))
[
yh1(x) + (1− y)h2(x)
y[h1(x)− h2(x)] + 1 + h2(x)
]
ν(dx)
)
,
(3.7)
which is negative by our assumptions and therefore s(t)→ {0, 1} a.s.
Note 3.3.1. What was shown is that under certain assumptions, we have that our evolutionary process converges to
either endpoint, but without the probabilities for 0 and 1. As such, this technique falls short of our goal. However,
we have conditions for the existence of an invariant measure.
We will continue with this technique and assume that h1(x) and h2(x) are constants, which we will denote as h1
and h2. We will only apply the stochastic Lyapunov functions f(y) = 1− y and f(y) = y and determine conditions
for which an invariant measure exists. Only using these functions simplifies the analysis, however, as will be seen
below, there are cases which we will be unable to say anything about the process.
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Applying f(y) = 1− y we get that
k(y) =y(1− y)ζJ(y)(−1) +
∫
R
[
y − y[1 + h1]
y[h1 − h2] + 1 + h2
]
ν(dx)
=y(1− y)
(
−ζ(y) +
∫
R
[
(h1 − h2) + h2 − h1
y[h1 − h2] + 1 + h2
]
ν(dx)
)
=y(1− y)
(
−ζ(y) +
∫
R
(h1 − h2)
[
1 +
−1
y[h1 − h2] + 1 + h2
]
ν(dx)
)
=− y(1− y)
(
ζ(y) + ν(R)(h2 − h1)
[
y[h1 − h2] + h2
y[h1 − h2] + 1 + h2
])
,
(3.8)
and so we must find conditions when
ζ(y) + ν(R)(h2 − h1)
[
y[h1 − h2] + h2
y[h1 − h2] + 1 + h2
]
≥ 0
⇐⇒ ([h1 − h2]y + 1 + h2)(−b+ [a+ b]y)− ν(R)[h1 − h2]2y + ν(R)[h2 − h1]h2 ≥ 0.
Simplifying, we see that
(h1 − h2)(a+ b)y2
+( a[h2 + 1] + b[−h1 + 2h2 + 1]− ν(R)[h1 − h2]2 )y
+( −b[h2 + 1] + ν(R)[h2 − h1]h2 ).
:=a′y2 + b′y + c′.
:=ϕ(y)
(3.9)
The quadratic equation yields the roots
−b′ +√(b′)2 − 4a′c′
2a′
and
−b′ −√(b′)2 − 4a′c′
2a′
.
Our method for determining convergence is to first assign a sign for each coefficient then check the size of each root.
Before we begin, notice that we need the constant term to always be positive, hence we will assume that
b <
ν(R)[h2 − h1]h2
h2 + 1
throughout the rest of the analysis.
1. Clearly if a′, b′ ≥ 0, we would have almost everywhere convergence to the set {0, 1}.
2. Assume the inequalities a′ > 0 and b′ < 0. When (b′)2−4a′c′ ≥ 0, since −b
′ +
√
(b′)2 − 4a′c′
2a′
≥ −b
′ −√(b′)2 − 4a′c′
2a′
,
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we only need to check when
−b′ −√(b′)2 − 4a′c′
2a′
≥ 1
⇐⇒ − b′ −
√
(b′)2 − 4a′c′ ≥ 2a′
⇐⇒ −
√
(b′)2 − 4a′c′ ≥ 2a′ + b′
⇐⇒ (b′)2 − 4a′c′ ≤ 4(a′)2 + 4a′b′ + (b′)2
⇐⇒ 0 ≤ a′ + b′ + c′
⇐⇒ ν(R)[h1 − h2]h1
h1 + 1
≤ a.
Hence the process converges to the set {0, 1} a.s. with this inequality. Moreover, when (b′)2− 4a′c′ < 0, which
is if and only if b2(1 + h1)
2 + a2(1 + h2)
2 + (h1 − h2)4ν(R)2 < −2b(−1 + h1)(h1 − h2)2ν(R)− 2a(b(1 + h1)(1 +
h2) + (h1 − h2)2(−1 + h2)ν(R)), we also get convergence.
3. We will now consider when a′, b′ < 0. Since
−b′ +√(b′)2 − 4a′c′
2a′
≤ 0, we only need
−b′ −√(b′)2 − 4a′c′
2a′
≥ 1
⇐⇒ −
√
(b′)2 − 4a′c′ ≤ 2a′ + b′
⇐⇒ (b′)2 − 4a′c′ ≥ 4(a′)2 + 4a′b′ + (b′)2
⇐⇒ a′ + b′ + c′ ≥ 0
⇐⇒ a ≥ ν(R)[h1 − h2]h1
h1 + 1
.
Therefore, if the last inequality holds, we will have almost sure convergence to the set {0, 1}.
4. Lastly, we will work with the inequalities a′ < 0 and b′ > 0. Since
−b′ +√(b′)2 − 4a′c′
2a′
≤ 0 ⇐⇒ c′ ≥ 0,
we are left with
−b′ −√(b′)2 − 4a′c′
2a′
≥ 1 ⇐⇒ −
√
(b′)2 − 4a′c′ ≤ 2a′ + b′.
From here we have two possibilities: |2a′ + b′| ≤ √(b′)2 − 4a′c′, which is if and only if a ≥ ν(R)[h1 − h2]h1
h1 + 1
;
and |2a′ + b′| ≥√(b′)2 − 4a′c′, and since this would imply that 2a′ + b′ > 0, we have
2a′ + b′ ≥
√
(b′)2 − 4a′c′ ⇐⇒ b′ ≥
√
(b′)2 − 4a′c′ − 2a′ >
√
(b′)2 − 2a′ = b′ − 2a′ > b′,
which is a contradiction Thus for a ≥ ν(B)[h1 − h2]h1
h1 + 1
, we have almost everywhere convergence to the set
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{0, 1}.
Next we will find criteria so that the process converges almost everywhere to 0. Applying f(y) = y we get
k(y) =y(1− y)ζJ(y) +
∫
R
[
y[1 + h1]
y[h1 − h2] + 1 + h2 − y
]
ν(dx)
=− y(1− y)
(
−ζ(y) + ν(R)(h1 − h2)
[
y[h1 − h2] + h2
y[h1 − h2] + 1 + h2
])
,
(3.10)
and so, as above, we need to determine when
− ζ(y) + ν(R)(h1 − h2)
[
y[h1 − h2] + h2(x)
y[h1 − h2] + 1 + h2
]
≥ 0
⇐⇒ ([h1 − h2]y + 1 + h2)(b− [a+ b]y) + ν(R)[h1 − h2]2y + ν(R)[h1 − h2]h2 ≥ 0.
Hence
(h2 − h1)(a+ b)y2
+( a[−h2 − 1] + b[h1 − 2h2 − 1] + ν(R)[h1 − h2]2 )y
+( b[h2 + 1] + ν(R)[h1 − h2]h2 ).
=− (a′y2 + b′y + c′).
=− ϕ(y)
(3.11)
Thus we have the same roots,
−b′ +√(b′)2 − 4a′c′
2a′
and
−b′ −√(b′)2 − 4a′c′
2a′
,
and will find conditions when a′y2 + b′y + c′ ≤ 0 for y ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, we will use the same methods and omit
details. Here we need the constant term to always be negative and hence we will assume that
b >
ν(R)[h2 − h1]h2
h2 + 1
.
A. If a′, b′ ≤ 0, we would have almost everywhere convergence to the set {0, 1}.
B. Assume the inequalities a′ > 0 and b′ < 0. Since
−b′ −√(b′)2 − 4a′c′
2a′
≤ 0 we only need to check when
−b′ +√(b′)2 − 4a′c′
2a′
≥ 1 ⇐⇒
√
(b′)2 − 4a′c′ ≥ 2a′ + b′. Reasoning as above, we have that √(b′)2 − 4a′c′ ≥
|2a′ + b′| and hence a ≤ ν(B)[h1 − h2]h1
h1 + 1
. Hence, under this inequality, the process converges almost surely to
the set {0, 1}.
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C. We will now consider when a′, b′ > 0. Since
−b′ −√(b′)2 − 4a′c′
2a′
≤ 0, we only need
−b′ +√(b′)2 − 4a′c′
2a′
≥ 1 ⇐⇒ a ≤ ν(R)[h1 − h2]h1
h1 + 1
.
Therefore, if the last inequality holds, we will have almost sure convergence to the set {0, 1}.
D. Lastly, we will work with the inequalities a′ < 0 and b′ > 0. If (b′)2 − 4a′c′ < 0, we are done.
Assume (b′)2 − 4a′c′ ≥ 0. Then since −b
′ −√(b′)2 − 4a′c′
2a′
≥ 0 we are left with
−b′ +√(b′)2 − 4a′c′
2a′
≥ 1 ⇐⇒ a ≤ ν(R)[h1 − h2]h1
h1 + 1
.
Thus we have almost everywhere convergence to the set {0, 1}.
We will now look at the rest of the cases.
I. Suppose that a′, b′ > 0, b >
ν(R)[h2 − h1]h2
h2 + 1
and a >
ν(R)[h1 − h2]h1
h1 + 1
. The last inequality implies
that the positive root
−b′ +√(b′)2 − 4a′c′
2a′
< 1. Thus −ϕ(y) is positive for
y ∈
[
0,
−b′ +√(b′)2 − 4a′c′
2a′
)
and negative for y ∈
(
−b′ +√(b′)2 − 4a′c′
2a′
, 1
]
.
II. If a′ < 0, b′ > 0, b >
ν(R)[h2 − h1]h2
h2 + 1
and (b′)2 − 4a′c′ ≥ 0 with a > ν(R)[h1 − h2]h1
h1 + 1
then, since
−b′ −√(b′)2 − 4a′c′
2a′
< 1 =⇒ a < ν(R)[h1 − h2]h1
h1 + 1
, we have that −ϕ(y) is positive for
y ∈
[
0,
−b′ −√(b′)2 − 4a′c′
2a′
)
and negative for y ∈
(
−b′ −√(b′)2 − 4a′c′
2a′
, 1
]
.
III. If a′ > 0, b′ < 0, b >
ν(R)[h2 − h1]h2
h2 + 1
and a >
ν(R)[h1 − h2]h1
h1 + 1
then −ϕ(y) is positive for
y ∈
[
0,
−b′ +√(b′)2 − 4a′c′
2a′
)
and negative for y ∈
(
−b′ +√(b′)2 − 4a′c′
2a′
, 1
]
.
IV. If a′ > 0, b′ < 0 and b <
ν(R)[h2 − h1]h2
h2 + 1
with (b′)2 − 4a′c′ ≥ 0 and a < ν(R)[h1 − h2]h1
h1 + 1
,
then, since
−b′ +√(b′)2 − 4a′c′
2a′
< 1 =⇒ a > ν(R)[h1 − h2]h1
h1 + 1
, this implies that ϕ(y) is positive for
y ∈
[
0,
−b′ −√(b′)2 − 4a′c′
2a′
)
and negative for y ∈
(
−b′ −√(b′)2 − 4a′c′
2a′
, 1
]
.
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V. If a′, b′ < 0, b >
ν(R)[h2 − h1]h2
h2 + 1
and a <
ν(R)[h1 − h2]h1
h1 + 1
then ϕ(y) is positive for
y ∈
[
0,
−b′ −√(b′)2 − 4a′c′
2a′
)
and negative for y ∈
(
−b′ −√(b′)2 − 4a′c′
2a′
, 1
]
.
VI. If a′ < 0, b′ > 0, b <
ν(R)[h2 − h1]h2
h2 + 1
and a <
ν(R)[h1 − h2]h1
h1 + 1
then, yet again, ϕ(y) is positive for
y ∈
[
0,
−b′ −√(b′)2 − 4a′c′
2a′
)
and negative for y ∈
(
−b′ −√(b′)2 − 4a′c′
2a′
, 1
]
.
Collecting everything we showed above, we have the criteria:
(i.) If a′, b′ ≥ 0 and b < ν(R)[h2 − h1]h2
h2 + 1
then s(t)→ {0, 1} a.s.
(ii.) If a′ > 0, b′ < 0 and b <
ν(R)[h2 − h1]h2
h2 + 1
with (b′)2 − 4a′c′ ≥ 0 and a ≥ ν(R)[h1 − h2]h1
h1 + 1
or (b′)2 − 4a′c′ ≤ 0
then s(t)→ {0, 1} a.s.
(iii.) If a′, b′ < 0, b <
ν(R)[h2 − h1]h2
h2 + 1
and a ≥ ν(R)[h1 − h2]h1
h1 + 1
then s(t)→ {0, 1} a.s.
(iv.) If a′ < 0, b′ > 0, b <
ν(R)[h2 − h1]h2
h2 + 1
and a ≥ ν(R)[h1 − h2]h1
h1 + 1
then s(t)→ {0, 1} a.s.
(v.) If a′, b′ ≤ 0 and b > ν(R)[h2 − h1]h2
h2 + 1
then s(t)→ {0, 1} a.s.
(vi.) If a′ > 0 and b′ < 0, b >
ν(R)[h2 − h1]h2
h2 + 1
and a ≤ ν(R)[h1 − h2]h1
h1 + 1
then s(t)→ {0, 1} a.s.
(vii.) If a′, b′ > 0, b >
ν(R)[h2 − h1]h2
h2 + 1
and a ≤ ν(R)[h1 − h2]h1
h1 + 1
then s(t)→ {0, 1} a.s.
(viii.) If a′ < 0, b′ > 0 and b >
ν(R)[h2 − h1]h2
h2 + 1
with (b′)2 − 4a′c′ < 0 or (b′)2 − 4a′c′ ≥ 0 and a ≤ ν(R)[h1 − h2]h1
h1 + 1
then s(t)→ {0, 1} a.s.
The rest of the cases below are inequalities for which we are unable to give existence of an invariant measure.
1. If a′, b′ > 0, b >
ν(R)[h2 − h1]h2
h2 + 1
and a >
ν(R)[h1 − h2]h1
h1 + 1
.
2. If a′ < 0, b′ > 0, b >
ν(R)[h2 − h1]h2
h2 + 1
and (b′)2 − 4a′c′ ≥ 0 with a > ν(R)[h1 − h2]h1
h1 + 1
.
3. If a′ > 0, b′ < 0, b >
ν(R)[h2 − h1]h2
h2 + 1
and a >
ν(R)[h1 − h2]h1
h1 + 1
.
4. If a′ > 0, b′ < 0 and b <
ν(R)[h2 − h1]h2
h2 + 1
with (b′)2 − 4a′c′ ≥ 0 and a < ν(R)[h1 − h2]h1
h1 + 1
.
5. If a′, b′ < 0, b >
ν(R)[h2 − h1]h2
h2 + 1
and a <
ν(R)[h1 − h2]h1
h1 + 1
.
6. If a′ < 0, b′ > 0, b <
ν(R)[h2 − h1]h2
h2 + 1
and a <
ν(R)[h1 − h2]h1
h1 + 1
.
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Chapter 4
Analysis of the Two Strategy Model
4.1 Calculation of the Approximated Invariant Measure
The stochastic Lyapunov method fell short of giving us exact information about the long run behavior the process.
The optimal result would be a theorem similar to that of Fudenberg and Harris [7] in which after verifying the
inequalities of the payoffs with respect to a combination of the white noise gives us this characteristic. After a
reasonable assumption, we will apply results given in [23] and [1] to give an adjustment of the inequalities given in
Fudenberg and Harris [7]. These inequalities are an approximation of the actual result since it is very difficult to
completely solve.
Define
α˜(y) = y(1− y)
[(
a12 − a22 + σ22 +
∫
R
(h2(x)− h1(x))ν(dx)
)
+ {(a11 − a21 − σ21) + (a22 − a12 − σ22)}y
]
,
β˜(y) =
σ2
2
y2(1− y)2,
and
y + γ(y, x) =
y[1 + h1(x)]
y[h1(x)− h2(x)] + 1 + h2(x) .
Moreover, for some 0 < y1 < y2 < 1, define τy1y2(y0) = infT≥0{s(T ) 6∈ (y1, y1)|s(0) = y0}, piy2;y1(y0) = P
(
s(τy1y2(y0)) ≥
y2
)
, and piy1;y2(y0) =
(
s(τy1y2(y0)) ≤ y1
)
.
Consider an integro-differential equation of the form
α˜(y)u′(y) + β˜(y)u′′(y) +
∫
R
[u(y + γ(y, x))− u(y)] ν(dx) = 0 for y ∈ (a, b), (4.1)
with the conditions u(y) = 0 for y ∈ [0, y1], and u(y) = 1 for y ∈ [y2, 1]. The papers of [23] and [1] tell us that
solving the integro-differential equation above will give us piy2;y1(y0), (interchanging the initial conditions will give
piy1;y2(y0).) However, in order to apply these theorems we need to verify the condition that E[τ
n
y1y2(y0)] is finite for
every n. Theorem 5.1 in the Chapter 5 §1, ensures us that this property holds.
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Remark 4.1.1. We should note here that the result in Tuckwell [23] is for a jump-diffusion with a Poisson measure
and not the compensated Poisson measure. However, Tuckwell’s proof is based off a result in Gihman and Skorohod
[8], in which the authors give an equality for the transition probability for a jump-diffusion with a compensated
Poisson measure (Part II Chapter 2 §9). A simple adjustment in the first order coefficient will give the equivalent
conclusions.
Solving this integro-differential equation is a very difficult task, and so we will construct a way to approximate
the solution. First we will assume that h1(x) = h2(x)+ , for a small, arbitrary  ∈ R. Next, we will turn the integral
into a Taylor series, using  as the variable, grouping the higher order terms into an error term. Note that we will
use the function f , instead of u, to find the solution, since normalizing f and considering the initial conditions will
determine u.
By our assumption we have that the integral difference term is
∫
R
[
f
(
y[1 + h2(x) + ]
y + 1 + h2(x)
)
− f(y)
]
ν(dx) := F ().
Clearly F (0) = 0,
F ′(0) =
∫
R
f ′
(
y[1 + h2(x) + ]
y + 1 + h2(x)
)(
y[1 + h2(x) + ]
y + 1 + h2(x)
)′
ν(dx)
∣∣∣∣
=0
=
∫
R
f ′
(
y[1 + h2(x) + ]
y + 1 + h2(x)
)(
y(1− y)[1 + h2(x)]
(y + 1 + h2(x))2
)
ν(dx)
∣∣∣∣
=0
= y(1− y)f ′(y)
∫
R
1
1 + h2(x)
ν(dx) = C1y(1− y)f ′(y),
and
F ′′(0) =
∫
R
{
f ′′
(
y[1 + h2(x) + ]
y + 1 + h2(x)
)(
y(1− y)[1 + h2(x)]
(y + 1 + h2(x))2
)2
+f ′
(
y[1 + h2(x) + ]
y + 1 + h2(x)
)(−2y2(1− y)[1 + h2(x)]
(y + 1 + h2(x))3
)}
ν(dx)
∣∣∣∣
=0
= −2y2(1− y)f ′(y)
∫
R
1
[1 + h2(x)]2
ν(dx) + y2(1− y)2f ′′(y)
∫
R
1
[1 + h2(x)]2
ν(dx)
= −2C2y2(1− y)f ′(y) + C2y2(1− y)2f ′′(y),
where C1 :=
∫
R
1
1 + h2(x)
ν(dx) and C2 :=
∫
R
1
[1 + h2(x)]2
ν(dx). Thus
F () = C1y(1− y)f ′(y)+ (−2C2y2(1− y)f ′(y) + C2y2(1− y)2f ′′(y))2/2 +O(3).
Excluding the error term, equation (4.1) becomes the second order differential equation
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α˜(y)f
′(y) + β˜(y)f ′′(y) = 0,
where
α˜(y) := y(1− y)
[(
a12 − a22 + σ22 + (C1 − ν(R))
)
+ {(a11 − a21 − σ21) + (a22 − a12 − σ22)− 2C2}y
]
and
β˜ :=
(
σ2
2
+
2
2
C2
)
y2(1− y)2.
Remark 4.1.2. Without the quadratic term in our approximation we would have β˜(y) =
(
σ2
2
)
y2
(
1− y)2, and if
σ1 = σ2 = 0 then β˜(y) ≡ 0. Hence, the quadratic term is included to ensure that β˜(y) > 0 for all y ∈ (0, 1).
Remark 4.1.3. Since we are approximating the exiting time of our stochastic replicator equation, we will define the
“new” process as sˆ(t) =
(
sˆ1(t), sˆ2(t)
)
.
We are now ready to state the main theorem for this section. The statement of the theorem is given from the
perspective of the dynamics of sˆ1(t), however, since sˆ2(t) = 1 − sˆt(t), understanding how sˆ1(t) evolves tells us how
sˆ2(t) evolves as well.
Theorem 4.1.1. Take sˆ(t) =
(
sˆ1(t), sˆ2(t)
)
in the remark above, A =
 a11 a12
a21 a22
 , σ2i the variance of the ith
subpopulation, C1 and C2 defined above, and y0 = (y0, y
′
0) ∈ ∆2.
(i) If a11 − a21 < σ
2
1 − σ22
2
− 
(
C1 − ν
(
R
))
+
2
2
C2 and a22 − a12 > σ
2
2 − σ21
2
+ 
(
C1 − ν
(
R
)) − 2
2
C2, then
Py0
(
lim
t→∞ sˆ1(t) = 0
)
= 1.
(ii) If a11 − a21 < σ
2
1 − σ22
2
− 
(
C1 − ν
(
R
))
+
2
2
C2 and a22 − a12 < σ
2
2 − σ21
2
+ 
(
C1 − ν
(
R
)) − 2
2
C2, then
Py0
(
lim sup
t→∞
sˆ1(t) = 1
)
= Py0
(
lim inf
t→∞ sˆ1(t) = 0
)
= 1.
(iii) If a11 − a21 > σ
2
1 − σ22
2
− 
(
C1 − ν
(
R
))
+
2
2
C2 and a22 − a12 < σ
2
2 − σ21
2
+ 
(
C1 − ν
(
R
)) − 2
2
C2, then
Py0
(
lim
t→∞ sˆ1(t) = 1
)
= 1.
(iv) If a11 − a21 > σ
2
1 − σ22
2
− 
(
C1 − ν
(
R
))
+
2
2
C2 and a22 − a12 > σ
2
2 − σ21
2
+ 
(
C1 − ν
(
R
)) − 2
2
C2, then
Py0
(
lim
t→∞ sˆ1(t) = 0
)
=
f(1)− f(y0)
f(1)− f(0) and Py0
(
lim
t→∞ sˆ1(t) = 1
)
=
f(y0)− f(0)
f(1)− f(0) .
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Proof. We will prove this theorem by proving four lemmas, where the lemmas correspond to each particular case of
inequalities.
Before we prove each lemma we give some intuition behind the inequalities in the theorem above, and use these
details as a basis of our proofs. Using an integrating factor we have
f ′(y) = k1 exp
{
−
∫ y
y0
α˜(z)
β˜(z)
dz
}
,
for some constant k1 and y0 ∈ (y1, y2). We will now work to simplify the integral in the exponent. Define N =
a12 − a22 + σ22 + (C1 − ν(B))+ and M = (a11 − a21 − σ21) + (a22 − a12 − σ22)− 2C2. Hence
−
∫ y
y0
α˜(z)
β˜(z)
dz = −
(
σ2
2
+
2
2
C2
)−1 ∫ y
y0
N +Mz
z(1− z) dz
= −
(
σ2
2
+
2
2
C2
)−1 ∫ y
y0
N +M
(1− z) +
N
z
dz
= log
(
(y/y0)
−
(
σ2
2 +
2
2 C2
)−1
N((1− y)/(1− y0))
(
σ2
2 +
2
2 C2
)−1
(N+M)
)
.
(4.2)
So f(y) = k1
∫ y
y0
(z/y0)
−
(
σ2
2 +
2
2 C2
)−1
N((1− z)/(1− y0))
(
σ2
2 +
2
2 C2
)−1
(N+M)dz − k2, for some constant k2.
Defining u(y) =
f(y)− f(y1)
f(y2)− f(y1) , f(y) = f(y1) for y ∈ [0, y1], and f(y) = f(y2) for y ∈ [y2, 1], we see that
α˜(y)u
′(y) + β˜(y)u′′(y) = 0 for y ∈ (y1, y2), u(y) = 0 for y ∈ [0, y1], and u(y) = 1 for y ∈ [y2, 1].
Note that
−
(
σ2
2
+
2
2
C2
)−1
N > −1 ⇐⇒ a22 − a12 − σ22 − (C1 − ν(B)) > −σ2/2−
2
2
C2
⇐⇒ a22 − a12 > σ
2
2 − σ21
2
+ (C1 − ν(B))− 
2
2
C2
and
(
σ2
2
+
2
2
C2
)−1
(N +M) > −1 ⇐⇒ a11 − a21 − σ21 + (C1 − ν(B))− 2C2 > −σ2/2−
2
2
C2
⇐⇒ a11 − a21 > σ
2
1 − σ22
2
− (C1 − ν(B)) + 
2
2
C2.
We are also able to conclude that
−
(
σ2
2
+
2
2
C2
)−1
N < −1 ⇐⇒ a22 − a12 < σ
2
2 − σ21
2
+ (C1 − ν(B))− 
2
2
C2
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and
(
σ2
2
+
2
2
C2
)−1
(N +M) < −1 ⇐⇒ a11 − a21 < σ
2
1 − σ22
2
− (C1 − ν(B)) + 
2
2
C2.
Using arguments similar to those in Gihman and Skorohod ([8] Part I Chapter 4 §16) we have the following
lemmas. We will only prove the first lemma, keeping in mind that the rest of the lemmas are proved similarly.
Lemma 4.1.1. If we have the inequalities
a11 − a21 < σ
2
1 − σ22
2
− (C1 − ν(B)) + 
2
2
C2 and a22 − a12 > σ
2
2 − σ21
2
+ (C1 − ν(B))− 
2
2
C2,
(
f(x)→∞ as x→ 1 and lim
x→0
f(x) <∞
)
, then
Py0
(
sup
t>0
sˆ(t) < 1
)
= Py0
(
inf
t>0
sˆ(t) = 0
)
= Py0
(
lim
t→∞ sˆ(t) = 0
)
= 1.
Proof. We will follow the proof in [8]. Since lim
y1→0
Py0 (sˆ(ty1y2(y0)) ≥ y2) = Py0
(
sup
t>0
sˆ(t) ≥ y2
)
, we have the
equality Py0
(
sup
t>0
sˆ(t) ≥ y2
)
=
f(y0)− f(0)
f(y2)− f(0) . Letting y2 → 1, we conclude that Py0 (sup sˆ(t) < 1) = 1. Also
Py0
(
inf
t>0
sˆ(t) ≤ y1
)
≥ Py0 (sˆ(ty1y2(y0)) ≤ y1) =
f(y2)− f(y0)
f(y2)− f(y1) → 1 as y2 → 1.
Showing that Py0
(
lim sup
t→∞
s(t) ≥ y2
)
= 0 will finish the proof. Define τq to be the first time passage of the
process past or to the point q < y0. By above we have Py0 (τq <∞) = 1. Furthermore, since τq is a stopping time
Py0
(
sup
t>0
sˆ(t+ τq) ≥ y2
)
= Py0
(
sup
t>0
sˆ(t) ≥ y2
∣∣∣∣sˆ(0) = q) = f(q)− f(0)f(y2)− f(0) . Moreover Py0
(
sup
t>0
sˆ(t+ τq) ≥ y2
)
=
Py0
(
sup
t>τq
sˆ(t) ≥ y2
)
≥ Py0
(
lim inf
t→∞ sˆ(t) ≥ y2
)
. Thus, taking q → 0 we obtain Py0
(
lim inf
t→∞ sˆ(t) ≥ y2
)
= 0. Therefore
lim inf
t→∞ sˆ(t) = 0 a.s. and we are done.
Lemma 4.1.2. If we have the inequalities
a11 − a21 < σ
2
1 − σ22
2
− (C1 − ν(B)) + 
2
2
C2 and a22 − a12 < σ
2
2 − σ21
2
+ (C1 − ν(B))− 
2
2
C2,
(f(x)→∞ as x→ 1 and f(x)→∞ as x→ 0), then
Py0
(
lim sup
t→∞
sˆ(t) = 1
)
= Py0
(
lim inf
t→∞ sˆ(t) = 0
)
= 1.
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Lemma 4.1.3. If we have the inequalities
a11 − a21 > σ
2
1 − σ22
2
− (C1 − ν(B)) + 
2
2
C2 and a22 − a12 < σ
2
2 − σ21
2
+ (C1 − ν(B))− 
2
2
C2,
(
f(x)→∞ as x→ 0 and lim
x→1
f(x) <∞
)
, then
Py0
(
inf
t>0
sˆ(t) > 0
)
= Py0
(
sup
t>0
sˆ(t) = 1
)
= Py0
(
lim
t→∞ sˆ(t) = 1
)
= 1.
Lemma 4.1.4. If we have the inequalities
a11 − a21 > σ
2
1 − σ22
2
− (C1 − ν(B)) + 
2
2
C2 and a22 − a12 > σ
2
2 − σ21
2
+ (C1 − ν(B))− 
2
2
C2,
(f(x) <∞ ∀x), then
Py0
(
sup
t>0
sˆ(t) < 1
)
= Py0
(
lim
t→∞ sˆ(t) = 0
)
=
f(1)− f(y0)
f(1)− f(0)
and
Py0
(
inf
t>0
sˆ(t) > 0
)
= Py0
(
lim
t→∞ sˆ(t) = 1
)
=
f(y0)− f(0)
f(1)− f(0) .
This is very similar to the results found by Fudenberg and Harris [7], with the added or subtracted piece (C1 −
ν(B))− 
2
2
C2. Recall that ν(B) gives us the intensity of the jumps. If we have that C1 > ν(B) then h2(x) < 0 for a
significant amount of x ∈ B, and if C1 < ν(B) then h2(x) > 0 for a significant amount of x ∈ B. Furthermore, when
h2(x) > 0 for a significant amount of x ∈ B, 
2
2
C2 is a very small, and when h2(x) < 0 for a significant amount of
x ∈ B, 
2
2
C2 is a large. This term would give a very little or considerable impact to the inequalities, respectively.
To show the importance of this term we will analyze the example of  > 0, h2(x) < 0 for all x ∈ B and
(C1 − ν(B)) − 
2
2
C2 > 0 . This would make it more difficult for the difference a22 − a12 to satisfy the inequality
a22−a12 > σ
2
2 − σ21
2
+ (C1−ν(B))− 
2
2
C2 and easier for a11−a21 > σ
2
1−σ22
2 − (C1−ν(B)) + 
2
2 C2. Hence, it is a bit
more likely that sˆ(t)→ 1 as t→∞ a.s. Since h1(t) = h2(t)+ , (1st subpopulation jump dominance), the population
playing the first strategy is not affected negatively as much as the population playing the second strategy, and thus
this result is what we would expect.
Remark 4.1.4. In most applications to this type of modeling, the Poisson measure and not the compensated Poisson
measure is used. This is a simple adjustment applied to our method. The replacement of the term (C1− ν(B)) with
C1 will suffice. It should also be noted that this new term has much more of an impact to the inequalities of the
payoffs.
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4.2 Simulations of the True and Approximated Stochastic Replicator
Dynamic
Since the results in the previous section are given by an approximation, we need to get an understanding of how
close this approximation is to the actual process. To accomplish this task, we will simulate each of the processes.
Note 4.2.1. For the approximation, sˆ(t), we have the infinitesimal generator,
Lf(y) = y(1− y) [(a12 − a22 + σ22 + (C1 − ν(B)))+ {(a11 − a21 − σ21) + (a22 − a12 − σ22)− 2C2}y] f ′(y)
+
(
σ2
2
+
2
2
C2
)
y2(1− y)2f ′′(y)
= α˜(y)f ′(y) + β˜(y)f ′′(y),
and considering Kolmogorov’s backward equation, we conclude that the process for the approximation is of the form
dsˆ(t) = α˜
(
sˆ(t)
)
dt+
√
2β˜
(
sˆ(t)
)
dW (t)
where W (t) is the Brownian motion given in §2.2.
Throughout this section, the red sample paths will be the approximated processes, while the blue sample paths
represents the true replicator process. In the simulations we will see how the size of , (which was defined to be
h1 − h2, can make a tremendous difference in behavior of the processes), as well the size of ν(R) (the intensity of
the Poisson measure). Under small Poisson perturbations, the long run behavior of both processes are essentially
equivalent.
Example 4.2.1. Take a11 = 1.2, a21 = 1, a22 = 0, a12 = 1, which is a strategy one dominate game, in which
over time the entire population would be playing strategy one. If we perturb this game by taking σ21 = .2, σ
2
2 = .8,
ν
(
R
)
= .2, h1 = .5 and h2 = .3, then according to Theorem 4.1.1, the entire population still would eventually be
playing strategy one. Simulating these processes yields exactly that:
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Switching the values of h1 and h2 to h1 = .3 and h2 = .5, the jumps now favor the 2
nd subpopulation instead of
the 1st subpopulation. For the approximated process, the behavior is the same, since this change did not affect the
inequalities of Theorem 4.1.1, however, the true process takes on more of a recurrent characteristic:
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This tells us that h1 − h2 may not be an appropriate size for . Increasing the size of h1 to .43 yields the same
long run behavior:
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Example 4.2.2. Now, take a11 = 1, a21 = 1, a22 = 3, a12 = 1, which is a strategy two dominate game, and hence
in the long run the entire population will play strategy two. If we perturb this game by taking σ21 = .4, σ
2
2 = .1,
ν
(
R
)
= .3, h1 = .7 and h2 = .6, the Theorem 4.1.1 tells us that the entire population will eventually be playing
strategy two. After simulation, we see agreement with both processes:
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Although the jumps favor the 1st subpopulation and  is larger than in the previous example, the difference of
a22 − a21 is large. Switching the values of h2 to h2 = .5 in order to slightly increases the size of , the behavior does
not change for the approximated process, but the true process now converges to both 0 and 1:
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Even though a22 − a21 is still large, a slight increase in the size of  gives quite different behavior. Finally, if we
increase the value of ν
(
R
)
to 2, with the original values of the jumps, h1 = .7 and h2 = .6, we see similar behavior
of the true replicator process when h2 = .5:
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Considering how increasing the value of  changed behavior, this is what we would expect. Thus, we need the term∫
R
(
h1 − h2
)
ν(dx) to be generally small.
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Example 4.2.3. For this example, we will simulate a coordination game. Take a11 = 1, a21 = 0, a22 = 1, a12 = 0,
and the perturbations as σ21 = .4, σ
2
2 = .1, ν
(
R
)
= .3, h1 = .7 and h2 = .6. Since the perturbations are the same as
the previous example, we know that the size of the jumps and the intensity of the Poisson measure are appropriate.
Theorem 4.1.1 tells us that the approximate process will converge to both 0 and 1 with the respective probabilities.
The simulation gives exactly that for each process:
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however, there appears to be different probabilities for convergence to each point. Decreasing the value of  to .05 (by
setting h2 = .65) yields the same number of times each process converges to each point:
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which tells us that the probabilities to converge to each point are very close (with respect of the initial value at .6).
4.3 Error Approximation
Consider the equation
α(y)u′(y) + β(y)u′′(y) +
∫
R
[
u
(
y + γ(y, x)
)
− u(y)
]
ν(dx) = 0, (4.3)
where we recall that α(y) = y
(
1 − y)( − b + (a + b)y), a := a11 − a21 − σ21 + ∫
R
(
h1(x) − h2(x)
)
ν
(
dx
)
and b :=
a22 − a12 − σ22 −
∫
R
(
h1(x) − h2(x)
)
ν
(
dx
)
, β(y) =
σ2
2
y2(1 − y)2, and y + γ(y, x) = y
[
1 + h1(x)
]
y
[
h1(x)− h2(x)
]
+ 1 + h2(x)
.
We want to consider this equation on a closed interval [y1, y2] that is a subset of (0, 1), where 0 < y1 < y2 < 1, and
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consider the space F of continuous functions on [y1, 1] defined by:
F =
{
u ∈ C([y1, 1])∣∣∣u(y1) = 0, u(y) = 1 for all y2 ≤ y ≤ 1}.
Although Tuckwell [23] tells us that a solution for (4.3) exists, we consider a different method to show that this
integro-differential equation supports such a solution. We certainly don’t need to consider the equation for y < y1.
We should be able to arrange that u(y1) = 0 by the choice of a constant of integration. If we restrict attention to
functions hi(x) satisfying
h1(x) > h2(x) > h > −1
for some h, then
γ(y, x) =
y
[
1 + h1(x)
]
y
[
h1(x)− h2(x)
]
+ 1 + h2(x)
− y
=
y
[
1 + h1(x)
]− y2[h1(x)− h2(x)]− y[1 + h2(x)]
y
[
h1(x)− h2(x)
]
+ 1 + h2(x)
=
y(1− y)[h1(x)− h2(x)]
y
[
h1(x)− h2(x)
]
+ 1 + h2(x)
> 0.
This shows that the integral term in (4.3) is zero for all y2 ≤ y ≤ 1, and the derivative terms are zero since the
functions under consideration are constant in this range. Thus, we will be able to replace γ(y, x) with γ(y, x)ϕ(y),
where ϕ is the characteristic function 1[y1,y2]. Our problem now is
α(y)u′(y) + β(y)u′′(y) +
∫
R
[
u
(
y + γ(y, x)ϕ(y)
)− u(y)]ν(dx) = 0, (4.4)
for u ∈ F .
We observe that the difference in the integral term can be written as
u
(
y + γ(y, x)ϕ(y)
)
− u(y) =
∫ y+γ(y,x)ϕ(y)
y
u′(z)dz,
and so
α(y)u′(y) + β(y)u′′(y) = −
∫
R
∫ y+γ(y,x)ϕ(y)
y
u′(z)dzν(dx).
Multiplying by an appropriate integrating factor and integrating gives us
(
fy1(u)u
′(y)
)′
= −fy1(y)
1
β(y)
∫
R
∫ y+γ(y,x)ϕ(y)
y
u′(z)dzν(dx),
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where
fy1(y) = exp
{∫ y
y1
α(w)
β(w)
dw
}
= exp
{
2
σ2
∫ y
y1
−b+ (a+ b)w
w(1− w) dw
}
=
(
y
y1
)−2b/σ2 (
1− y
1− y1
)−2a/σ2
.
We now make a change of variables from the function u to the function v(y) = fy1(y)u
′(y). We are able to recover
an appropriate function u since
u(y) =
∫ y
y1
v(s)
fy1(s)
ds,
and hence u(y1) = 0 as required by F . Our simplified equation is now of the form
v′(y) = −fy1(y)
1
β(y)
∫
R
∫ y+γ(y,x)ϕ(y)
y
v(z)
fy1(z)
dzν(dx).
Notice that
fy1(y)
fy1(z)
=
exp
{∫ y
y1
α(w)
β(w)dw
}
exp
{∫ z
y1
α(w)
β(w)dw
} = exp{∫ y
z
α(w)
β(w)
dw
}
= fz(y).
Using this and integrating once gives us
v(y) = −
∫ y
y1
1
β(s)
∫
R
∫ s+γ(s,x)ϕ(s)
s
fz(s)v(z)dzν(dx)ds+ C. (4.5)
Without loss of generality, we consider the explicit problem
v(y) = −
∫ y
y1
1
β(s)
∫
R
∫ s+γ(s,x)ϕ(s)
s
fz(s)v(z)dzν(dx)ds+ 1, (4.6)
since multiplying this by C will give us a solution of (4.5).
Remark 4.3.1. For our ultimate u to lie in F , we need
u(y2) =
∫ y2
y1
v(s)
fy1(s)
ds = 1,
and this can be achieved by an appropriate choice of C.
It comes down, then, to finding a solution of (4.6) in C([y1, y2]). We consider this in the context of constant
small jump differences. Therefore we take a small  ∈ R,  > 0 and set h1(x) = h2(x) + . Then a is replaced by
a = a+ ν(R) and b with b = b− ν(R). Furthermore, γ(y, x) is replaced with
γ(y, x) =
(1− y)
y + 1 + h2(x)
.
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Let
Tv(y) = −
∫ y
y1
1
β(s)
∫
R
∫ s+γ(s,x)ϕ(s)
s
fz(s, )v(z)dzν(dx)ds,
for
fz(s, ) =
(s
z
)−2b/σ2 (1− s
1− z
)−2a/σ2
.
Then our problem for v is
(I − T)v = 1, i.e. v = (I − T)−11, (4.7)
provided that I − T is invertible.
First we note that T maps C
(
[y1, y2]
)
to itself. The characteristic function ϕ guarantees that T is a well define
map on C
(
[y1, y2]
)
. Since T involves no more than integrations involving continuous functions bounded on [y1, y2],
the value Tv is again a function in C([y1, y2]). Finally,
∣∣∣Tv(y)∣∣∣ ≤ ∫ y2
y1
1
β(s)
∫
R
∫ s+γ(s,x)ϕ(s)
s
fz(s, )|v(z)|dzν(dx)ds
≤
∫ y2
y1
1
β(s)
∫
R
∫ s+γ(s,x)ϕ(s)
s
fz(s, )dzν(dx)ds ||v||∞
≤
∫ y2
y1
1
β(s)
max
z∈[y1,y2]
fz(s, )
∫
R
∫ s+γ(s,x)ϕ(s)
s
dzν(dx)ds ||v||∞
=
∫ y2
y1
1
β(s)
max
z∈[y1,y2]
fz(s, )
∫
R
γ(s, x)ϕ(s)ν(dx)ds ||v||∞
= 
∫ y2
y1
∫
R
1
β(s)
max
z∈[y1,y2]
fz(s, )
(1− s)
s+ 1 + h2(x)
ds ν(dx) ||v||∞
≤ ν(R)
∫ y2
y1
1
β(s)
max
z∈[y1,y2]
fz(s, )
(1− s)
s+ 1 + h
ds ||v||∞
≤ ν(R) max
s∈[y1,y2]
[
1
β(s)
max
z∈[y1,y2]
fz(s, )
(1− s)
s+ 1 + h
]
(y2 − y1) ||v||∞.
Therefore
‖Tv‖∞ = max
y∈[y1,y2]
|Tv(y)| ≤ K||v||∞,
which implies that ||T|| ≤ K, where
K = ν(R) max
s∈[y1,y2]
[
1
β(s)
max
z∈[y1,y2]
fz(s, )
(1− s)
s+ 1 + h
]
(y2 − y1) <∞.
Since ||T|| < 1 for  sufficiently small, we conclude by Theorem 3.2.8 in Taira [21] that I − T is invertible and we
actually have the series representation of the solution
v = 1 + T1 + T
2
 1 + T
3
 1 + · · ·
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that is uniformly convergent, i.e., convergent in C
(
[y1, y2]
)
, and where each successive term is O(n) as n→∞.
61
Chapter 5
Characterizations of the General Model
5.1 Evolutionary Stable Strategies
Much of the work done in this chapter is based off of a paper written by Imhof [11]. Take {e1, e2, . . . , en} as the
standard basis of Rn. Define ∆n =
{
y ∈ Rn : yi > 0 for all i and
∑
yi = 1
}
(the open simplex) and ∆n as it’s closure.
Furthermore, for the Euclidean norm | · |, define Uδ(y0) = {y ∈ ∆n : |y0 − y| < δ} and τG = inf{t > 0 : s(t) ∈ G},
where G is a Borel set. Recall that si(t) is of the form
dsi(t) = si(t−)
(As(t−))
i
−
∑
j
sj(t−)
(
As(t−))
j
+
∑
j
sj(t−)σ2j − si(t−)σ2i
+
∫
B
 1 + hi(x)
1 +
∑
j sj(t−)hj(x)
− 1 +
∑
j
sj(t−)hj(x)− hi(x)
 ν(dx)
 dt
+ si(t−)
(
σidWi(t)−
∑
j
sj(t−)σjdWj(t)
)
+ si(t−)
∫
B
(
1 + hi(x)
1 +
∑
j sj(t−)hj(x)
− 1
)
N˜(dt, dx).
(5.1)
Define h(x) = (h1(x), h2(x), . . . , hn(x))
T . With a little work one can see that
ds(t) = D1(s(t−),h(x))dt+D2(s(t−))dW(t) +
∫
R
D3(s(t−),h(x))N˜(dt, dx)
where
D1(y,h(x)) = [diag(y1, . . . , yn)− yyT ][A− diag(σ21 , . . . , σ2n)]y
+
∫
R
(
yh(x)T − diag(h1(x), . . . , hn(x))
+
1
1 + yTh(x)
diag(1 + h1(x), . . . , 1 + hn(x))− diag(1, . . . , 1)
)
y ν(dx),
D2(y,h(x)) = [diag(y1, . . . , yn)− yyT ]diag(σ1, . . . , σn),
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and
D3(y,h(x)) =
(
1
1 + yTh(x)
diag(1 + h1(x), . . . , 1 + hn(x))− diag(1, . . . , 1)
)
y,
Denote AJ as the second order integro-differential operator. For f ∈ C2(∆n), we see that
AJf(y) =
∑
j
D1j (y,h(x))
∂f
∂yj
(y) +
1
2
∑
j,k
γjk(y)
∂2f
∂yj∂yk
(y)
−
∑
j
∫
R
D3j (y,h(x))ν(dx)
∂f
∂yj
(y) +
∫
R
(
f
(
D3(y,h(x)) + y
)− f(y))ν(dx),
where Dij is the j
th coordinate of the function Di and γjk(y) =
∑
l
cjl(y)ckl(y) for cjl(y) =
 yj(1− yj)σj , j = l−yjylσl j 6= l .
Notice that we can simplify the operator so that
AJf(y) =
∑
j
D˜1j (y,h(x))
∂f
∂yj
(y) +
1
2
∑
j,k
γjk(y)
∂2f
∂yj∂yk
(y)
+
∫
R
(
f
(
D3(y,h(x)) + y
)− f(y))ν(dx),
for
D˜1i (y,h(x)) = yi(ei − y)T [A− diag(σ21 , . . . , σ2n)]y +
∫
R
yi
(∑
k
ykhk(x)− hi(x)
)
ν(dx).
Before we prove a theorem about evolutionary stable strategies we will show that for some k our stochastic
replicator equation becomes close to ek. Since the corner points of the simplex are absorbing, this is how we would
expect the process to behave.
Theorem 5.1.1. Take s(t) to be an n-dimensional stochastic replicator dynamics (5.1), the matrix A as an arbitrary
payoff matrix, and for  > 0, τ := inf
{
t > 0 : sk(t) ≥ 1−  for some k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
}
. Then for y ∈ ∆n,
Ey[τ] <∞,
and
Py
{
sup
t>0
max{s1(t), . . . , sn(t)} = 1
}
= 1.
Proof. We will follow the proof of Theorem 4.3 in Imhof [11]. For α > 0 and y ∈ ∆n define the positive function
g(y) = neα −
∑
k
eαyk . Define the “new” payoff matrix A˜ := A − diag(σ21 , . . . , σ2n) and the infinitesimal generator
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AJ . Then
AJg(y) = −α
∑
k
yk(ek − y)T A˜yeαyk − α
2
2
∑
k
y2k
(
σ2k(1− yk)2 +
∑
j 6=k
σ2j yj
)
eαyk
− α
∫
R
∑
k
yk
∑
j
yjhj(x)− hk(x)
 eαykν(dx)
+
∫
R
[∑
k
exp{αyk} −
∑
k
exp
{
αyk
(
1 + hk(x)
)
1 +
∑
j yjhj(x)
}]
ν(dx).
For σmin := min{σ1, . . . , σn} and a constant β > 0 such that |(ek − y)T A˜y| ≤ β for all y ∈ ∆n and all
k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Imhof showed that
−α
∑
k
yk(ek − y)T A˜yeαyk − α
2
2
∑
k
y2k ≤ α
∑
k
yke
αyk
[
β − ασ
2
min
2
yk
(
1− yk
)2]
. (5.2)
Furthermore, for κmax := sup
x∈R
max{h1(x), . . . , hn(x)}, κmin := inf
x∈R
min{h1(x), . . . , hn(x)}, and M :=
∫
R
(
κmax −
κmin
)
ν(dx), we have the inequality
α
∫
R
∑
k
yk
−∑
j
yjhj(x) + hk(x)
 eαykν(dx) ≤ α∑
k
yke
αykM. (5.3)
Recalling the inequality −ex ≤ −1− x for x > 0, we have
∫
R
[∑
k
exp{αyk} −
∑
k
exp
{
αyk
(
1 + hk(x)
)
1 +
∑
j yjhj(x)
}]
ν(dx)
≤
∑
k
∫
R
[
exp{αyk} − 1−
αyk
(
1 + hk(x)
)
1 +
∑
j yjhj(x)
]
ν(dx)
=
∑
k
∫
R
[ ∞∑
n=0
(αyk)
n
n!
− 1− αyk
(
1 + hk(x)
)
1 +
∑
j yjhj(x)
]
ν(dx)
=
∑
k
αyk
∫
R
[ ∞∑
n=1
(αyk)
n−1
n!
− 1 + hk(x)
1 +
∑
j yjhj(x)
]
ν(dx)
≤
∑
k
αyk
∫
R
[ ∞∑
n=1
(αyk)
n−1
n!
]
ν(dx)
=
∑
k
αyk exp{αyk}
∫
R
[
exp{−αyk}
∞∑
n=1
(αyk)
n−1
n!
]
ν(dx)
≤ α
∑
k
yk exp{αyk}ν
(
R
)
.
(5.4)
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Collecting Equations (5.2), (5.3), and (5.4), we see that
AJg(y) ≤ α
∑
k
yke
αyk
[(
β +M + ν
(
R
))− ασ2min
2
yk
(
1− yk
)2]
Now for an arbitrarily small  > 0, choose α > 0 large enough that α
σ2min
2
y
(
1− y)2 ≥ (β +M + ν(R))n+ 1 for all
y ∈ [ 1n , 1− ]. Furthermore, take y ∈ ∆n such that yi ≤ 1−  for all i. For our y, there is at least one yk such that
yk ≥ 1
n
and hence
AJg(y) ≤ α
(
β +M + ν
(
R
)) ∑
k: yk<1/n
yke
αyk + α
∑
k: yk≥1/n
yke
αyk
(
− (n− 1)
(
β +M + ν
(
R
))− 1)
≤ α
(
β +M + ν
(
R
))
(n− 1)e
α/n
n
+ α
eα/n
n
(
− (n− 1)
(
β +M + ν
(
R
))− 1)
= −αe
α/n
n
.
Now by Dynkin’s formula for every finite T ,
0 ≤ Ey
[
g
(
s
(
τ ∧ T
))]
= g(y) + Ey
[∫ τ∧T
0
AJg
(
s(t)
)
dt
]
≤ neα − αe
α/n
n
Ey
[
τ ∧ T
]
.
Therefore, by the monotone convergence theorem, letting T →∞ yields the inequality Ey
[
τ
] ≤ n2 eα/n
n
.
Finally, take  = 1/m for m ∈ N. Then Py
(
sup
t>0
max{s1(t), . . . , sn(t)} ≥ 1− 1/m
)
= 1, and therefore
1 = Py
( ∞⋂
m=1
{
sup
t>0
max{s1(t), . . . , sn(t)} ≥ 1− 1/m
})
= Py
(
sup
t>0
max{s1(t), . . . , sn(t)} = 1
)
.
Take A to be a payoff matrix for a game. A strategy p ∈ ∆n is called an evolutionary stable strategy if:
qTAp ≤ pTAp for all q ∈ ∆n; and for q ∈ ∆n where q 6= p and qTAp = pTAp, we have that q ·Aq < p ·Aq. Imhof
[11] noted that the concept of an evolutionary stable strategy, although a stronger notion than a Nash equilibria, is
not strong enough to hold by itself in a stochastic setting. The author adjusted for this weakness by assuming the
payoff matrix is conditional negative definite, which is defined below. From these assumptions, the author was then
able to show conditions for stability near an evolutionary stable strategy. We utilize this technique developed by the
author.
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Definition 5.1.1. A matrix A is said to be conditionally negative definite if for y ∈ Rn\{0} where 1Ty = 0, we
have
yTAy < 0.
Lemma (Imhof [11]). Suppose that A is an n × n (n ≥ 2) conditionally negative definite matrix, define A =
1
2
(A+AT ) and let λ2 be the second largest eigenvalue of
D := A− 1
n
A11T − 1
n
11TA+
1TA1
n
11T .
Then
max
xT 1=0
x6=0
xTAx
xTx
= λ2 < 0.
We are now ready to state and prove the theorem.
Theorem 5.1.2. Take s(t) as above, p ∈ ∆n an ESS for our payoff matrix A. Define
κ2J =
1
2
∑
j
pjσ
2
j −
1
2
∑
j σ
−2
j
+
∫
B
max
k
hk(x)ν(dx)
+
∑
j
pj
∫
B
log
(
1 + maxk hk(x)
1 + hj(x)
)
ν(dx)−
∑
j
pj
∫
B
hj(x)ν(dx)
and assume that 0 < κJ <
n
n− 1
√
|λ2| min
1≤j≤n
pj. Furthermore, assume that
∫
B
(∑
j
(pj − yj)hj(x) − 1
)
ν(dx) < 0
for all y ∈ ∆n. Then for δ > 0 such that δ2 > κ2J/|λ2|, y ∈ ∆n, and t > 0, we have the inequalities
Ey
[
τUδ(p)
] ≤ d(y,p)|λ2|δ2 − κ2J . (5.5)
and
Ey
[
1
t
∫ t
0
|s(u)− p|2du
]
≤ 1|λ2|
(
d
(
y,p
)
t
+ κ2J
)
. (5.6)
Lastly, an invariant measure pi(·) of the stochastic replicator dynamic, exists, is unique, and
pi
(
Uδ(p)
)
≥ 1− κ
2
J
|λ2|δ2 . (5.7)
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Proof. Our proof will very closely follow the one given by Imhof [11]. For p ∈ ∆n an ESS for A, define the function
v(y) =
∑
j pj log
(
pj/yj
)
. Applying AJ (the infinitesimal generator) to v, we see that
AJv(y) = −
∑
j
pi(ei − y)T [A− diag(σ21 , . . . , σ2n)]y +
1
2
∑
j
pj
(
σ2j − 2yjσ2j +
∑
k
y2kσ
2
k
)
−
∑
j
pj
∫
R
(
hj(x)−
∑
k
ykhk(x)
)
ν(dx) +
∑
j
pj
∫
R
log
(
1 +
∑
k ykhk(x)
1 + hj(x)
)
ν(dx)
= (y − p)TAy − 1
2
∑
j
y2jσ
2
j +
1
2
∑
j
pjσ
2
j −
∑
j
pj
∫
R
(
hj(x)−
∑
k
ykhk(x)
)
ν(dx)
+
∑
j
pj
∫
R
log
(
1 +
∑
k ykhk(x)
1 + hj(x)
)
ν(dx)
≤ (y − p)TAy − 1
2
∑
j
y2jσ
2
j +
1
2
∑
j
pjσ
2
j +
∫
R
max
k
hk(x)ν(dx)−
∑
j
pj
∫
R
hj(x)ν(dx)
+
∑
j
pj
∫
R
log
(
1 + maxk hk(x)
1 + hj(x)
)
ν(dx).
In the proof of Theorem 2.1 in [11], Imhof showed that (y−p)TAy ≤ λ2|y−p|2 and −1
2
∑
j
y2jσ
2
j ≤ −
1
2
∑
j σ
−2
j
.
Thus, for y ∈ ∆n,
AJv(y) ≤ λ2|y − p|2 + κ2J .
Our assumption δ2 > κ2J/|λ2| tells us for y ∈ ∆n\Uδ(p), AJv(y) ≤ λ2δ2 + κ2J . By Itoˆ’s lemma, the process
v(s(t))−(λ2δ2 +κ2J)t is a local supermartingale on the interval [0, τUδ(p)). Therefore v(y) ≥
(
|λ2|δ2−κ2J
)
Ey
[
τUδ(p)
]
,
which shows Equation (5.5). The strong Markov property tells us that the stochastic replicator dynamic is recurrent
in the set Uδ(p). Furthermore, by choosing a δ0 > 0 where κJ < δ0 <
n
n− 1
√
|λ2| min
1≤j≤n
pj , Imhoff [11] in Theorem
2.1 showed that ∆n\
{
∆n ∩ Uδ(p)
}
= ∅. Thus, our process never hits the boundary and we are able to pick any
δ > 0 for which the inequality holds.
Now define τk = inf{t > 0 : v(s(t)) = k}, where k > V (y). Applying Dynkin’s formula we see that
0 ≤ Ey
[
v(s
(
t ∧ τk
)]
= v(y) + Ey
[∫ t∧τk
0
AJv
(
s(u)
)
du
]
≤ v(y) + λ2Ey
[∫ t∧τk
0
|s(u)− p|2du
]
+ κ2JEy
[
t ∧ τk
]
Since t ∧ τk → t as k →∞, the bounded convergence theorem yields Equation (5.6).
Finally, to show Equation (5.7) we need to show that the transition probabilities converge in total variation to
an invariant measure (which makes this measure unique). To accomplish this task we will apply Theorem 5.2 in
Down et al [4]. In order to satisfy the hypotheses of the theorem, we need to show that our process is ψ-irreducible
(page 1674 [4]) and aperdiodic (page 1675 [4]). To show the ψ-irreducible condition, we define the Borel measure
ψ(O) = M
(
O ∩ Uδ(p)
)
, where M is the Lebesgue measure, and ηO :=
∫ ∞
0
1{s(t)∈O}dt (the occupancy time). Since
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we know our process is recurrent in Uδ(p) , if ψ(O) > 0 then Ey[ηO] > 0.
To show the aperiodic condition we need to find a small Borel set B and a time T such that Py(t, B) > 0 for all
t ≥ T and all y ∈ B. A clear candidate for B is the set Uδ(p). Before we show this conditions holds, we will note
that since the Poisson measure is generated by a Le´vy process, (and so the initial condition for Le´vy process is Dirac
measure δ0), independent of all the Wiener processes, the jumps are only dependent on time.
To show that this condition holds, we will follow the proof of Claim 1 given in [15]. Since ν
(
R
)
< ∞, we may
rewrite s(t) as
s(t) = y +
∫ t
0
Dˆ1
(
s(t−),h(x))dt+ ∫ t
0
D2
(
s(t−))dW(t) + ∫ t
0
∫
R
D3(s(t−),h(x))N(dt, dx),
where
Dˆ1
(
y,h(x)
)
=
[
diag(y1, . . . , yn)− yyT
][
A− diag(σ21 , . . . , σ2n)
]
y +
∫
R
(
yh(x)T − diag(h1(x), . . . , hn(x))ν(dx).
For the finite interval [0, t′] (for any t′ > 0), there is a positive Py probability that a jump does not occur. On this
event, s(t) agrees with the process
l(t) = y +
∫ t
0
Dˆ1
(
l(t),h(x)
)
dt+
∫ t
0
D2
(
l(t)
)
dW(t).
Thus, considering Theorem 2.1 in Imhoff [11], the condition holds.
Lastly, we need to show that AJV (·) ≤ −cV (·) + b1Uδ(p)(·) where V ≥ 1, V ∈ D(AJ), and c, b > 0. Define
V (y) = K +
∏
l
y−pll , where K is a positive constant which will later be determined. So
AJV (y) = −
∑
i
pi
(ei − y)T [A− diag(σ21 , . . . , σ2n)]y + ∫R
(∑
j
yjhj(x)− hi(x)
)
ν(dx)
∏
l
y−pll
+
1
2
∑
i
pi(pi + 1)
(1− 2yi)σ2i +∑
j
y2jσ
2
j
∏
l
y−pll +
1
2
∑
i
∑
i 6=k
pipk
∑
j
y2jσ
2
j − yiσ2i − ykσ2k
∏
l
y−pll
+
∫
R
(
V
(
D3(y,h(x)) + y
)
− V (y))ν(dx)
= (y − p)TAy ·
∏
l
y−pll +
∫
R
∑
j
(pj − yj)hj(x)ν(dx) ·
∏
l
y−pll +
∑
j
yj(pj − yj)σ2j ·
∏
l
y−pll
+
∑
i
pi
[
(1− 2yi)σ2i +
∑
j
y2jσ
2
j
]∏
l
y−pll −
1
2
∑
i
pi
∑
k 6=i
pk
[
(1− 2yi)σ2i +
∑
j
y2jσ
2
j
]∏
l
y−pll
+
1
2
∑
i
∑
i 6=k
pipk
[∑
j
y2jσ
2
j − yiσ2i − ykσ2k
]∏
l
y−pll +
∫
R
(
V
(
D3(y,h(x)) + y
)
− V (y))ν(dx)
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= (y − p)TAy ·
∏
l
y−pll +
∫
R
∑
j
(pj − yj)hj(x)ν(dx) ·
∏
l
y−pll +
∑
j
pi(1− yj)σ2j ·
∏
l
y−pll
− 1
2
∑
i
∑
k 6=i
pipk
[
(1− yi)σ2i + ykσ2k
]∏
l
y−pll +
∫
R
(
V
(
D3(y,h(x)) + y
)
− V (y))ν(dx)
≤
(
λ2|p− y|2 +
∑
j
pi(1− yj)σ2j +
∫
R
(∑
j
(pj − yj)hj(x)− 1
)
ν(dx)
− 1
2
∑
i
∑
k 6=i
pipk
[
(1− yi)σ2i + ykσ2k
])∏
l
y−pll +
∫
R
1 + maxj hj(x)
1 + minj hj(x)
ν(dx) := C(y)
∏
l
y−pll + ς,
for
C(y) = λ2|p− y|2 +
∑
j
pi(1− yj)σ2j +
∫
R
(∑
j
(pj − yj)hj(x)− 1
)
ν(dx)− 1
2
∑
i
∑
k 6=i
pipk
[
(1− yi)σ2i + ykσ2k
]
and
ς =
∫
R
1 + maxj hj(x)
1 + minj hj(x)
ν(dx).
To finish the inequality, we note that
C(y)
∏
l
y−pll + ς =
(
C(y)
∏
l y
−pl
l
V (y)
+
ς
V (y)
)
V (y)
=
(
C(y)
∏
l y
−pl
l
K +
∏
l y
−pl
l
+
ς
K +
∏
l y
−pl
l
)
V (y) ≤
(
C(y) +
ς
K
)
V
(
y
)
.
By our assumptions C(y) < 0 for y ∈ ∆n\Uδ(p). Thus, taking K large enough so that C(y) + ςK < 0 for all
y ∈ ∆n\Uδ(p) and V ≥ 1, we are able to find a constants c, b > 0 such that AJV (y) ≤ −cV (y) + b1Uδ(p)(y) holds
for all y ∈ ∆n.
Defining OC := ∆n\O and pi(·) as the invariant measure, we have
pi
(
Uδ(p)
C
)
= lim
t→∞Ey
[
1
t
∫ t
0
1Uδ(p)C
(
s(u)
)
du
]
≤ lim
t→∞Ey
[
1
t
∫ t
0
|s(u)− p|2
δ2
du
]
≤ κ
2
J
|λ2|δ2 ,
and therefore Equation (5.7) follows.
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5.2 Strict Nash and Stochastic Stability in the Presence of
Continuous and Random Jumps
We call a strategy p ∈ ∆n a strict Nash Equilibria if for q ∈ ∆n such that q 6= p, qTAp < pTAp. In this
section we examine strict Nash Equilibria and how random jumps and white noise affect the stability of replicator
dynamics. Throughout this section take pure strategy Sk as a strict Nash Equilibria, i.e., akk > ajk for all j 6= k.
Since the characteristics of the jumps are able to impact stability we define the functions ψkmin(x) := min
j 6=k
hj(x),
ψkmax(x) := max
j 6=k
hj(x), and ψmax(x) := max
j
hj(x). Furthermore, from these functions we define the integrals I
k
1 :=∫
R
(
hk(x)− ψkmin(x)
)2
1 + ψmax(x)
ν(dx) and Ik2 :=
∫
R
ψkmin(x)
2 + hk −
(
1 + hk(x)
)
ψkmax(x)
1 + ψmax(x)
ν(dx). Finally, for the purposes of
the theorem below, for A˜ defined in Theorem 4.1, define β := max{|a˜ji| : 1 ≤ j, i ≤ n}.
Theorem 5.2.1. Take the matrix A and the process s(t) defined in Equation (5.1). Assume that for the pure strategy
Sk and the corresponding variance σ
2
k, we have the inequality akk > ajk + σ
2
k for all j 6= k (hence Sk is a strict Nash
equilibrium), hi(x) is nonnegative for all i, and −2β + Ik2 ≥ 0. Furthermore, for α > 0, where α + ajk < akk − σ2k
for all j 6= k, assume α+ 2β − Ik1 ≥ 0. Then for every δ > 0,
Py˜
(
lim
t→∞ s(t) = ek
)
≥ 1− 1− y˜k
1− δ . (5.8)
Proof. Take A˜ as in Theorem 4.1. Applying the infinitesimal generator AJ to our Lyaponuv function g(y) = 1− yk,
we have
AJg(y) = −yk(ek − y)T A˜y
+−yk
∫
R
 1 + hk(x)
1 +
∑
j yjhj(x)
+
∑
j
yjhj(x)− hk(x)− 1
 ν(dx)
+
∫
R
(
1−
(
yk
(
1 + hk(x)
)
1 +
∑
j yjhj(x)
− yk + yk
)
+ 1− yk
)
ν(dx)
= −yk(ek − y)T A˜y
+−yk
∫
R
hk(x)−
∑
j yjhj(x) +
(∑
j yjhj(x)
)2
− hk(x)
∑
j yjhj(x)
1 +
∑
j yjhj(x)
 ν(dx)
Imhof [11] showed that
−yk(ek − y)T A˜y ≤ −yk
[
(α+ 2β)yk − 2β
]
g(y), (5.9)
so we must focus on the integral term.
For y ∈ ∆n, we have 1 +
∑
j
yjhj(x) ≥ 1 + min
j
hj(x) > 0 by Assumption 2.1. Hence, we may just focus on the
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numerator of the integrand to find an inequality. Using the ψk· functions defined in the beginning of the section, we
determine that
∫
R
[
hk(x)−
∑
j
yjhj(x) +
∑
j
yjhj(x)
2 − hk(x)∑
j
yjhj(x)
]
ν(dx)
=
∫
R
[
hk(x)− ykhk(x)−
∑
j 6=k
yjhj(x) +
ykhk(x) +∑
j 6=k
yjhj(x)
2 − ykhk(x)2 − hk(x)∑
j 6=k
yjhj(x)
]
ν(dx)
≥
∫
R
[
hk(x)− ykhk(x)− ψkmax(x)
∑
j 6=k
yj +
ykhk(x) + ψkmin(x)∑
j 6=k
yj
2 − ykhk(x)2 − hk(x)ψkmax(x)∑
j 6=k
yj
]
ν(dx)
=
∫
R
[
hk(x)− ykhk(x)− ψkmax(x)(1− yk) +
(
ykhk(x) + ψ
k
min(x)(1− yk)
)2
− ykhk(x)2 − hk(x)ψkmax(x)(1− yk)
]
ν(dx)
=
∫
R
[
hk(x)− ykhk(x)− ψkmax(x)(1− yk) + y2khk(x)2 + 2ykhk(x)ψkmin(x)(1− yk) + ψkmin(x)2(1− yk)2
− ykhk(x)2 − hk(x)ψkmax(x)(1− yk)
]
ν(dx)
=
∫
R
[
hk − ψkmax(x) +−ykhk(x)2 + 2ykhk(x)ψkmin(x) + ψkmin(x)2(1− yk)− hk(x)ψkmax(x)
]
ν(dx) · (1− yk)
=
∫
R
[
− yk
(
hk(x)
2 − 2hk(x)ψkmin(x) + ψkmin(x)2
)
+ ψkmin(x)
2 + hk(x)−
(
1 + hk(x)
)
ψkmax(x)
]
ν(dx) · (1− yk)
=
∫
R
[
− yk
(
hk(x)− ψkmin(x)
)2
+ ψkmin(x)
2 + hk(x)−
(
1 + hk(x)
)
ψkmax(x)
]
ν(dx) · (1− yk).
Hence we have the inequality
−yk
∫
R

(∑
j yjhj(x)
)2
− hk(x)
∑
j yjhj(x)
1 +
∑
j yjhj(x)
 ν(dx) ≤ −yk[− Ik1 yk + Ik2 ]g(y). (5.10)
Thus by Equations (17) and (18)
AJg(y) ≤ −yk
[(
α+ 2β − Ik1
)
yk −
(
2β − Ik2
)]
g(y) := gˆ(y).
With our assumptions we have gˆ(y) ≤ 0 for every y ∈ ∆n. For an arbitrary δ > 0, define Vδ =
{
y ∈ ∆n : yk > δ
}
,
and τVδ as the first time the process leaves Vδ. Then g
(
s
(
t ∧ τVδ
))
is a local supermartingale, and thus for y˜ ∈ Vδ,
Py˜
(
sup
0≤t<∞
g
(
s
(
t ∧ τVδ
)) ≥ 1− δ) ≤ g(y˜)
1− δ
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which implies
Py˜
(
sup
0≤t<∞
g
(
s
(
t ∧ τVδ
))
< 1− δ
)
≥ 1− g
(
y˜
)
1− δ .
Notice that for  > 0, there is a d > 0 such that gˆ(y) ≤ −d on Vδ\U(ek). Therefore, applying the logic given in the
proof of Theorem 2 in Kushner [14], we are able to conclude the theorem.
Remark 5.2.1. If for all x we have |ψmax(x) − ψmin(x)| is small and hk(x) is sufficiently larger than ψmax(x),
then Ik2 ≥ 0. Hence, if 2β is small enough, we have −2β + I2k ≥ 0. Furthermore, if Ik1 < Ik2 , it is very likely that
2β− Ik1 ≥ 0, and so α+ 2β− Ik1 ≥ 0. However, if 2β− Ik1 < 0, then α could be large enough so that α+ 2β− Ik1 ≥ 0.
A case like this is possible with σ2k small and min
{|akk − ajk| : 1 ≤ j ≤ n and j 6= k} relatively large.
Corollary 5.2.1. Assume that for the pure strategy Sj and the corresponding variance σ
2
j , we have the inequality
akk > ajk +σ
2
j for all j 6= k, hi(x) is nonnegative for all i, −2β+ Ik2 < 0, α+ 2β− Ik1 > 0, and Ik1 ≤ Ik2 +α/2. Then
there exists a neighborhood of ek, say V ⊂ ∆n, such that for any y˜ ∈ V and λ = sup
y∈∂V
|1− yk|,
Py˜
(
lim
t→∞ s(t) = ek
)
≥ 1− 1− y˜k
1− λ .
Proof. From Theorem 5.1, we have the inequality AJg(y) ≤ −yk
[(
α+2β−Ik1
)
yk−
(
2β−Ik2
)]
g(y) Define V =
{
y ∈
∆n : yk >
1
2
α+ 4β − 2Ik2
α+ 2β − Ik1
}
. Since −yk
[(
α+ 2β− Ik1
)
yk−
(
2β− Ik2
)]
g(y) is negative for y ∈ V , the rest of the proof
follows the proof given in Theorem 5.1.
5.3 Dominated Pure Strategies
In the past sections we have shown conditions which the process will converge to a pure strategy but we have not
considered the possibility of a pure strategy that the process will never converge to. We say that a strategy q is
dominated by p if for any strategy you play against your better payoff comes from strategy p, i.e., qTAp′ ≤ pTAp′
for all p′ ∈ ∆n. Our focus will be on the extinction of a dominated pure strategy under appropriate stochastic
perturbations.
Theorem 5.3.1. Let the pure strategy Sk be dominated by the mixed strategy p ∈ ∆n. For our payoff matrix A
define K1 = min
q∈∆n
{
pTAq− eTkAq
}
, K2 = −σ
2
k
2
+
1
2
∑
j
pjσ
2
j , and define σmax = max{σ1, . . . , σn}. Suppose that
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K2 < K1, and hk(x) ≤
∑
j
pjhj(x) for all x ∈ R. Then for every y ∈ ∆n,
Py
(
sk(t) = o
(
exp
{
t
∫
R
(
hk(x)−
∑
j
pjhj(x)
)
ν(dx)− (K1 −K2)t+ 3σmax
√
t log log t
} ))
= 1.
Proof. We will proceed as in Theorem 3.1 (Imhof [11]). Working from the dominating mixed strategy p, define
G(t) = log
(
sk(t)
)−∑
j
pj log
(
sj(t)
)
. Itoˆ’s lemma yields
G(t) =G(0) +
∫ t
0
(
eTkAs(u)− pTAs(u)−
σ2k
2
+
1
2
∑
j
pjσ
2
j
)
du
+ σkWk(t)−
∑
j
pjσjWj(t)
+ t
∫
R
(∑
j
pjhj(x)− hk(x) + log
(
1 + hk(x)
1 +
∑
j pjhj(x)
))
ν(dx)
+
∫ t
0
∫
R
log
(
1 + hk(x)
1 +
∑
j pjhj(x)
)
N˜(dx, du).
(5.11)
For the integral
∫ t
0
∫
R
log
(
1 + hk(x)
1 +
∑
j pjhj(x)
)
N˜(dx, du) notice that the integrand is not dependent on the time
variable. Hence
∫ t
0
∫
R
log
(
1 + hk(x)
1 +
∑
j pjhj(x)
)
N(dx, du) is a compound Poisson process. Since ν
(
R
)
< ∞, Theorem
36.5 in Sato [18] tells us that
lim
t→∞
1
t
∫ t
0
∫
R
log
(
1 + hk(x)
1 +
∑
j pjhj(x)
)
N(dx, du) =
∫
R
log
(
1 + hk(x)
1 +
∑
j pjhj(x)
)
ν(dx) a.s.
Therefore
lim
t→∞
1
t
∫ t
0
∫
R
log
(
1 + hk(x)
1 +
∑
j pjhj(x)
)
N˜(dx, du) = 0 a.s.
Now for σ˜ :=
[
(1−pk)2σ2k+
∑
j 6=k
p2jσ
2
j
]1/2
, we see that W˜ (t) :=
[
σkWk(t)−
∑
j
pjσjWj(t)
]
/σ˜ is a standard Wiener
process, and that σ˜ ≤ 3σmax. Thus, Py almost surely
G(t) ≤ G(0) +
(
K1 −K2
)
t+ σ˜W˜ (t) +
∫ t
0
∫
R
log
(
1 + hk(x)
1 +
∑
j pjhj(x)
)
N˜(dx, du)
+ t
∫
R
(∑
j
pjhj(x)− hk(x) + log
(
1 + hk(x)
1 +
∑
j pjhj(x)
))
ν(dx).
(5.12)
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Therefore, applying the Law of the Iterated Logarithm, we see that
lim sup
t→∞
sk(t) exp
[
t
∫
R
(
hk(x)−
∑
j
pjhj(x)
)
ν(dx)− (K1 −K2)t− 3σmax
√
t log log t
]
≤ lim sup
t→∞
exp
[
G(t) + t
∫
R
(
hk(x)−
∑
j
pjhj(x)
)
ν(dx)− (K1 −K2)t− 3σmax
√
t log log t
]
≤ lim sup
t→∞
exp
[
G(0) +
∫ t
0
∫
R
log
(
1 + hk(x)
1 +
∑
j pjhj(x)
)
N˜(dx, du) + t
∫
R
log
(
1 + hk(x)
1 +
∑
j pjhj(x)
)
ν(dx)
+ σ˜W˜ (t)− 3σmax
√
t log log t
]
= 0.
(5.13)
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1 Comparison of the Models for the Two Strategy Case
A natural question arises after the creation of the stochastic models; how close are the stabilities of the stochastic
models to the stable equilibria of the deterministic model as well as how the random jumps affect the stability of the
Fudenberg and Harris model?
Take
A =
 a11 a12
a21 a22
 ,
as the payoff matrix and x = (x1, x2) to be the replicator dynamics. Recall that the deterministic replicator dynamics
simplifies to
x˙1 = x1(1− x1)[(a12 − a22) + (a11 − a21 + a22 − a12)x1].
With this dynamic, we have the following stability:
I. when a11−a21 > 0 and a22−a12 < 0 the only stable equilibrium is the point (1, 0), which is called the strategy
1 dominate game;
II. switching the inequalities, a11−a21 < 0 and a22−a12 > 0, the only equilibrium that is stable is the point (0, 1),
and is known as the strategy 2 dominate game;
III. when a11 − a21 > 0 and a22 − a12 > 0 the points (0, 1) and (0, 1) are locally asymptotically stable, and(
a22 − a12
a11 − a21 + a22 − a12 ,
a22 − a12
a11 − a21 + a22 − a12
)
is unstable, and since the better payoffs are when both players
are playing the same strategy, this is the so called Coordination game;
IV. finally, switching the inequalities above yields a11− a21 < 0 and a22− a12 < 0, and we have the endpoints (1, 0)
and (0, 1) are unstable, and
(
a12 − a22
a21 − a11 + a12 − a22 ,
a12 − a22
a21 − a11 + a12 − a22
)
is stable, which is called the purely
mixed strategy game.
We will recall the results of Fudenberg and Harris (§1.3). For an arbitrary y ∈ ∆2, σ21 the variance of the
subpopulation playing the first strategy and σ22 the variance of the subpopulation playing the second strategy,
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Fudenberg and Harris showed that if:
A. a11 − a21 > σ
2
1 − σ22
2
and a22 − a12 < σ
2
2 − σ21
2
then Py
(
lim
t→∞ s(t) = 1
)
= 1;
B. a11 − a21 < σ
2
1 − σ22
2
and a22 − a12 > σ
2
2 − σ21
2
then Py
(
lim
t→∞ s(t) = 0
)
= 1;
C. a11−a21 > σ
2
1 − σ22
2
and a22−a12 > σ
2
2 − σ21
2
then Py
(
lim
t→∞ s(t) = 0
)
=
I1
I1 + I2
and Py
(
lim
t→∞ s(t) = 1
)
=
I2
I1 + I2
,
for Ii defined in the first chapter;
D. a11 − a21 < σ
2
1 − σ22
2
and a22 − a12 < σ
2
2 − σ21
2
then Py
(
sup
t>0
s(t) = 1
)
= Py
(
inf
t>0
s(t) = 0
)
= 1.
Clearly, when the difference of the variances is small compared with the difference of the payoffs, the system does
not change. For an example, take the strategy 1 dominate game. If a11 − a21 = 2 and a22 − a12 = −1, and the
difference of the variances is σ21 − σ22 = 3, then the point (1, 0) is still stable. Although the stable equilibrium in the
purely mixed strategy game appears to be negated, in that the stochastic process will not converge to this point, in
the long-run there is a large probability that the process will be in a small neighborhood of the deterministic stable
point [7].
However, under large differences in the variances, the process could be completely perturbed. Consider when
a11−a21 = −1 and a22−a12 = 2, and σ21−σ22 = 6. Deterministically, the population will converge to everyone playing
the second strategy, however since the variance of the subpopulation playing the first strategy is large compared to
the variance of the subpopulation playing the second strategy and the differences of the payoffs, the population will
eventually choose playing the first strategy.
We will now recall the stochastic stability conditions of our approximated evolutionary process. We defined h1(x)
and h2(x) as the jump-affect of the first and second subpopulations respectively, assumed that h1(x) − h2(x) = ,
where  is for an arbitrary small number, C1 :=
∫
R
1
1 + h2(x)
ν(dx), C2 :=
∫
R
1[
1 + h2(x)
]2 ν(dx) If:
2A. a11−a21 > σ
2
1 − σ22
2
−
(
C1−ν
(
R
))
+
2
2
C2 and a22−a12 < σ
2
2 − σ21
2
+
(
C1−ν
(
R
))−2
2
C2 then Py
(
lim
t→∞ sˆ(t) = 1
)
=
1;
2B. a11−a21 < σ
2
1 − σ22
2
−
(
C1−ν
(
R
))
+
2
2
C2 and a22−a12 > σ
2
2 − σ21
2
+
(
C1−ν
(
R
))−2
2
C2 then Py
(
lim
t→∞ sˆ(t) = 0
)
=
1;
2C. a11−a21 > σ
2
1 − σ22
2
−
(
C1−ν
(
R
))
+
2
2
C2 and a22−a12 > σ
2
2 − σ21
2
+
(
C1−ν
(
R
))−2
2
C2 then Py
(
lim
t→∞ sˆ(t) = 0
)
=
f(1)− f(y1)
f(1)− f(0) and Py
(
lim
t→∞ s(t) = 1
)
=
f(y1)− f(0)
f(1)− f(0) ;
2D. a11−a21 < σ
2
1 − σ22
2
−
(
C1−ν
(
R
))
+
2
2
C2 and a22−a12 < σ
2
2 − σ21
2
+
(
C1−ν
(
R
))−2
2
C2 then Py
(
sup
t>0
sˆ(t) = 1
)
=
Py
(
inf
t>0
sˆ(t) = 0
)
= 1.
76
This result is very similar to the Fudenberg and Harris result since we are comparing a11−a21 and a22−a12 with
σ21 − σ22
2
− 
(
C1 − ν
(
R
))
+
2
2
C2 and −
(
σ21 − σ22
2
− 
(
C1 − ν
(
R
))
+
2
2
C2
)
respectively.
6.2 The General n
We will now consider the theorems for the general n case and how they correspond to the equivalent theorems for
the stochastic replicator dynamic diffusion.
The conditions of Theorem 5.1.2 are considerably stronger than the conditions given for the diffusion version of
the stochastic replicator dynamic, Theorem 2.1 [11].
For Theorem 5.2.1, the condition that akk > ajk + σ
2
j for all j 6= k tells us that the white noise is not very strong
and as such does not command a large presence in the dynamics. For the continuous stochastic replicator dynamic,
this is sufficient enough to have convergence to a pure Nash equilibria, given that the initial condition is in the proper
neighborhood of the pure strategy, Theorem 4.1 [11]. When considering the right-continuous stochastic replicator
dynamic, the added assumptions of hi(x) is nonnegative for all i, −2β+ Ik2 < 0, α+ 2β− Ik1 > 0, and Ik1 ≤ Ik2 +α/2,
tell us that the size of the jump functions are very close to each other with respect to the payoffs and variances. As
such, the jumps are very small perturbations to the dynamics, and the result is very intuitive. However, even with
these small perturbations, we are still not able to give an almost sure convergence to the pure strategy. Now, if the
jump function hk is dominant compared to the rest of the jump functions and the payoffs, which is the assumption
−2β + Ik2 ≥ 0, then for any neighborhood of the pure strategy, we have a strong probability of converging to the
pure strategy. This result revels how commanding the jump perturbations are to the dynamics.
Lastly, Theorem 5.3.1, the conditions are the same with the added hk(x) ≤
∑
j
pjhj(x) for every x ∈ R, which is
what we would expect.
6.3 Future Work
Theorem 5.2.1, and Corollary 5.2.1, are not very sharp. I would like to improve these probabilities. Furthermore,
the continuous stochastic replicator dynamic has conditions for which the process will converge to a pure strategy
almost surely. I am uncertain if conditions can be given so that this characteristic is also true for the right-continuous
stochastic replicator dynamic, but I would like to show this to be false or be true.
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List of Symbols
Si - the i
th strategy
aij - The payoff of strategy Si playing against strategy Sj
A - payoff matrix
u - payoff function
ui - the fitness function for the i
th subpopulation
ri - the number of players of the i
th subpopulation
si - the frequency of the i
th subpopulation
dt - Lebesgue measure
Wi - standard Wiener process
dWi(t) - Ito´ integral
σi - variance of the ri growth
σ -
√
σ21 + σ
2
2
X - Rd valued Le´vy process
∆Xω(s) - Xω(s)−Xω(s−)
Nω(t, ·) - #
{
0 ≤ s ≤ t : ∆Xω(s) ∈ ·
}
ν(·) - Le´vy measure
N˜ω(dt, dx) - Nω(dt, dx)− dtν(dx)
C2b - space of twice differentiable continuous bounded functions
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